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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of Article 
Criminal sentencing is the realm where the state acts in its most coercive
manner against its citizens.  Sanctions range from life imprisonment— 
and, in some parts of the United States, the death penalty1—to the mere
1. The United States and Japan are the only two developed democratic countries 
that still impose the death penalty. See Death Penalty Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.





















   




   
 
    
[VOL. 51:  343, 2014] The Punishment Should Fit the Crime 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
formal censure in the form of a good behavior bond or probation.  There 
are multiple considerations relevant to the determination of a penalty. 
The most important is the seriousness of the crime.  Jurisprudentially, 
this position is persuasive despite pragmatic difficulties associated with
matching the harshness of the sanction to the severity of the crime.2 
However, sentencing practice over the past two decades has
overwhelmed sentencing jurisprudence.  Often, the main consideration 
in determining offense severity has little to do with the severity of the 
crime and nearly everything to do with the profile of the offender.3  In 
common law countries, the prior criminal history of an offender is the 
most important sentencing consideration, after offense seriousness, and
can be so significant that it means the difference between receiving a 
small fine or many years in jail.4  The issue is pervasive given that most 
offenders have at least one prior conviction.5  This has resulted in a large 
increase in imprisonment numbers despite the fact that, somewhere along 
the way, a sound justification has not been provided for pulverizing
recidivists. 
Punishing recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders is intuitively 
appealing.6  Most people, including lawyers and judges, share the view
2. See generally JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A 
CRITICAL INVESTIGATION (2004) (discussing using the seriousness of crimes to determine 
punishment levels). 
3. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventative Detention, Character Evidence, and the 
New Criminal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 723 (2010) (noting “the criminal law
increasingly focuses on the characteristics of the offender rather than the characteristics
of the offense”).
4. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 
in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 303, 303 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
The recidivist premium extends beyond the common law world to countries such as 
China, Ghana, Israel, and Korea. See  JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT 
OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 115 (2008); Roberts, 
supra, at 309. 
5. See Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing Enhancements: Rationales
and Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality Principles and Social 
Equality Goals, in  PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVES 117, 133 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010); Kevin R. 
Reitz, The Illusion of Proportionality: Desert and Repeat Offenders, in  PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 137, 
137; see also infra Part IV (discussing data regarding prior convictions). 
6. This has been described as a deeply held intuition. See Thomas Mahon, 
Justifying the Use of Previous Convictions as an Aggravating Factor at Sentencing, 



























    
   
 
    
  
   
that repeat offenders deserve additional punishment.7 There is, however, 
no settled justification for this practice and, in particular, there is no tenable
theory which suggests that recidivists should be punished considerably 
more severely than offenders without a criminal history.  Principally, the 
punishment should fit the crime, not the antecedent actions of the person
who committed the crime.
This Article examines the manner in which prior convictions should 
influence penalty severity.  The issue is complex; it has been described
as “one of the most contested questions in the field of criminal sentencing.”8 
This Article undertakes a thorough examination of the key normative 
issues and relevant empirical data with the aim of informing legislatures
of appropriate ways in which to deal with prior convictions when
sentencing. 
There are three broad approaches that can be used to deal with prior
convictions.  First, they may be ignored and, hence, not affect the severity of 
the sanction.9  Second, at the other end of the spectrum, prior convictions 
may be used as a basis for imposing progressively more severe sanctions
for each new offense.10  This is called the cumulative principle and, in some
jurisdictions, it was the dominant approach to sentencing recidivists during
the second half of the nineteenth century.11  Third, and in the middle, there 
is what is termed the progressive loss of mitigation theory, which is the 
view that a degree of mitigation should be accorded to first-time offenders
cing.ThomasMahon.pdf; see also Ralph Henham, Anglo-American Approaches to
Cumulative Sentencing and the Implications for UK Sentencing Policy, 36 HOWARD J. 
CRIM. JUST. 263, 266 (1997) (noting that retributivists “deserve[]” to be punished for 
repeated criminal law violations). 
7. See Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to 
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL 
AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 91, 107; see also Julian V. Roberts, First-
Offender Sentencing Discounts: Exploring the Justifications, in  PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS 
AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 17 (discussing
that first-time offenders deserve less harsh sentences than repeat offenders). 
8. PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 5, at vi. 
9. This is called flat-rate sentencing. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 198 (5th ed. 2010). A principal proponent of this approach is George 
Fletcher.  See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 466 (1978). More 
than a decade ago this Author too, argued for flat-rate sentencing.  Mirko Bagaric, 
Double Punishment and Punishing Character: The Unfairness of Prior Convictions, 19 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 10, 10 (2000).  However, this Author has since changed his stance on 
flat-rate sentencing due to the emerging empirical data regarding the efficacy of 
incapacitation in reducing crime. See infra Part III.C.3.
10. See ASHWORTH, supra note 9, at 198. 
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or those with a minor criminal record.12  This mitigation is used up by 
offenders who repeatedly come before the courts, thereby resulting in
increased penalties for recidivists.13  However, unlike the case of the
cumulative principle, there is a limit, set by the principle of proportionality,
to the extent to which recidivists can be punished more harshly.14 
Part II of this Article illustrates how prior convictions are often the 
cardinal consideration in the sentencing calculus.  Part III examines the 
correct approach to punishing recidivists from the perspective of the 
main theories of punishment—retributivism and utilitarianism.  The Part
argues that within a retributive construct there is no basis for imposing 
severer sanctions on retributivists.  From the utilitarian perspective, the 
deterrence rationale that is often advanced for the recidivist loading is 
unsound.15  However, evidence does suggest that the theory of general 
incapacitation does result in penalty reduction for the serious offenses.16 
This provides a valid basis for somewhat harsher penalties for offenders 
who have prior convictions for serious crimes.  The penalty loading that 
is appropriate is, however, modest compared to the significant
enhancements that are often currently imposed.17  The discriminatory 
impact of a recidivist premium is discussed in Part IV of this Article. 
The reform and policy implications of this Article’s findings are 
considerable. Part V of this Article suggests that there is a need for
fundamental reform of the criminal sentencing law.  To the extent that 
prior convictions are relevant at all, this should be informed by the
objectives of sentencing and their relevance to attaining these objectives.
The upshot is that prior convictions should have considerably less 
weight in sentencing outcomes, which would result in greater coherence 
and transparency in sentencing law and practice and a considerable drop 
in imprisonment numbers.18  It would also put an end to the gratuitous
12. See Jesper Ryberg, Recidivism, Retributivism and the Lapse Model of Previous 
Convictions, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 37, 37. 
13. As noted in Part III.B.1. of this Article, some versions of this theory limit the 
discount to first offenders. 
14. See Ryberg, supra note 12, at 37. 
15. See infra Part III.C. 
16. See infra Part III.C.3. 
17. See infra Part III.C.3. 





















     
    
  
 
   
      
 
 
       
   
  
cruelty, in the form of pointless prison time inflicted on millions of 
individuals.19 
Prior to turning to substantive matters, the fundamental tension that 
underpins the key hypothesis considered in this Article must be addressed. 
B. Further Explanation of the Paradox: Crime Severity Turns on the 
Damage Caused to the Victim; Penalties Are Increasingly      
Determined By the Antecedents of the Offender 
All law is complex—this is necessarily the case given the multi-
faceted nature of the human condition and the infinite range of human
interactions. Sentencing law is particularly complex.  There are four
main reasons for this: (1) the objectives of sentencing law—which are
typically community protection, rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution
and denunciation—are not settled;20 (2) the objectives which are pursued 
are often conflicting;21 (3) the efficacy of sentencing to achieve key 
objectives is not empirically validated and, in some cases, is empirically
contradicted;22 and (4) in some jurisdictions there are more than one
hundred discrete considerations which can influence sentencing outcomes.23 
However, among this chaos there are two relatively settled aspects of 
sentencing law and practice; one is theoretical and the other is pragmatic.
They contradict each other and it is this contradiction that sets the theme
for this Article. 
There is considerable disparity in the penalties imposed on offenders 
across jurisdictions and within jurisdictions.24  Yet, there is one principle 
that has widespread acceptance regarding setting the appropriate penalty: 
the principle of proportionality.25  In its simplest—and arguably most 
persuasive—form, it is the view that the punishment should equal the 
crime.
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 1 & n.1 (2003). 
21. See MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 
11 (2001).
22. See the discussion in Part V of this article. 
23. Joanna Shapland identified 229 factors. See  JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN 
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE: THE PROCESS OF MITIGATION 55 (1981).
24. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8–9, 
103 (1973); BAGARIC, supra note 21, at 191–213. 
25. See RYBERG, supra note 2, at 12–13; Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of
Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 489, 491 (1994) (quoting Andrew 
von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 55, 56, 
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The principle of proportionality, at least in theory, operates to “restrain 
excessive, arbitrary and capricious punishment”26 by requiring that
punishment not exceed the gravity of the offense, even where it seems 
certain that the offender will immediately reoffend.27 
The proportionality principle strikes a strong impressionistic cord28 
and transcends numerous other areas of the law.29  The notion that the
response must be commensurate with the harm caused—or threatened— 
is at the core of the criminal defenses such as self-defense30 and necessity.31 
It is also at the foundation of civil law damages for injury, which aim to 
compensate for the actual loss suffered and provide equitable remedies
that are proportional to the detriment sought to be avoided.32  In the
international law arena, the concept of proportionality dictates the nature 
of retaliatory measures that can be taken in response to breaches of free
trade agreements,33 and the extent of force that can be taken in self-defense
against an aggressor.34  In the human rights realm, proportionalism is often
invoked as a basis for limiting or negating rights in order to promote the
common good or achieve governmental objectives.35 
26. Fox, supra note 25, at 492. 
27. See RYBERG, supra note 2, at 12–13. The principle is sometimes termed 
proportionalism. See id.
28. See id. at 2. 
29. See Thomas Poole, Proportionality in Perspective 16–17 (LSE Law, Society
and Economy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 16/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1712449. 
30. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Punishment, and Proportionality, 10 
LAW & PHIL. 323, 328 (1991). 
31. For a thorough examination of this defense, see In re A, [2000] EWCA (Civ) 
254, [2001] Fam. 147 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/
2000/254.html.
32. See Fox, supra note 25, at 491 (citing Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170
CLR 394, 417, 441 (Austl.); HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY AND DEATH 3–5 (3d ed. 1990)). 
33. SHERZOD SHADIKHODJAEV, RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM 42–45 (2009). 
34. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Proportionality (in War), in 7 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 4168, 4169–70, 4172–73 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2013); see also
Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1073, 1075–78 (2012) (discussing the proportionality principle in regard
to international counterinsurgency operations). 
35. See Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, Social Rights in the Age of
Proportionality: Global Economic Crisis and Constitutional Litigation, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
660, 665–66 (2012); Charles-Maxime Panaccio, In Defence of Two-Step Balancing and


























   
 
 
   
  
    
 
  




The importance of proportionality in sentencing is underlined by the 
fact that it is one of the few principles of sentencing where there appears
to be a significant degree of consensus among lawyers and philosophers 
regarding its relevance and significance, notwithstanding the gulf that 
normally exists between sentencing and theories of punishment.36 
The key aspect of the principle is that it has two limbs.  The first is the 
seriousness of the crime; the second is the harshness of the sanction.37 
Further, the principle has a quantitative component—the two limbs must 
be matched.38  In order for the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of 
the crime must be equal to the harshness of the penalty.
The relevance of proportionalism is undermined by the fact that there 
is considerable uncertainty regarding the exact measures by which the 
punishment can be matched to the crime.39  For present purposes, the key
issue relates to factors that properly inform the assessment of offense
severity.  Although there is some uncertainty in this regard, the principal 
consideration is the harm caused by the offense, as measured by the extent 
to which it sets back the interests of the victim.40  It is for this reason that, in
most societies, the most serious crimes are homicide offenses, given that
they result in the destruction of human life, and it is universally accepted 
that other offenses that cause considerable damage to victims, such as
sexual and violent offenses, should be severely punished.41 
Thus, crime severity, which is the main consideration that should
determine the harshness of the sanction, is mainly contingent upon the 
level of harm caused to the victim.42  The antecedents of the offender are
irrelevant to this matter.
10 (2011); Denise Réaume, Limitations on Constitutional Rights: The Logic of
Proportionality 2–3 (Univ. of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 26/2009, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463853. 
36. See BAGARIC, supra note 21, at 1–10 (discussing the gaps between punishment 
theories and sentencing).
37. See RYBERG, supra note 2, at 12. 
38. See id. 
39. As noted by Professor Jesper Ryberg, one of the key criticisms of the theory is
that it “presupposes something which is not there, namely, some objective measure of 
appropriateness between crime and punishment.”  RYBERG, supra note 2, at 184. 
40. See Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-
Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32–33 (1991). 
41. Homicide and rape are considered some of the most serious offenses in 
America.  See Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth Violence: A Cautionary Tale, in 42 
CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: 1975-2025, at 265, 268 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013).
Generally, the most severe crimes should receive the most severe punishment.  See 
BARBARA MACKINNON & ANDREW FIALA, ETHICS: THEORY & CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
367 (8th ed. 2014). 
42. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 40, at 33 (“[T]he extent of the injury
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Whether a person is killed or raped by a first-time offender or a career 
criminal, the level of harm is identical.  It is for this reason that the orthodox 
view is that prior convictions are not relevant to the proportionality
principle.43  Yet, increasingly, an offender’s prior convictions are assuming 
a considerable role in the determination of the penalty.44  Ostensibly, this 
makes sentencing more about the character and background of the offender 
than the harm caused by the offense: the focus moves from ensuring that 
the punishment fits the crime to the punishment fitting the person.
This approach is not necessarily flawed; there may be a justification 
for it. However, the doctrinal oddity associated with this approach
commands a concrete explanation and justification, and the main objective
of this Article, therefore, is to examine whether such a justification exists. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO SENTENCING: 
CURRENT PRACTICE
A. Recidivist Premium and Imprisonment Rates 
By way of background, this Article now examines the extent to which 
prior convictions currently influence sentencing outcomes in four 
jurisdictions, which, to varying degrees, reflect the different main theoretical 
approaches. I start with the jurisdiction that penalizes recidivists most
harshly—the United States—and end with the jurisdiction that accords
the least weight to prior convictions—Sweden.  The United Kingdom and 
Australia are considered because their treatment of recidivists falls
somewhere between that accorded in the United States and in Sweden.
The Article proceeds in the order of most to least punitive. 
As an interesting aside, given that most offenders have prior convictions, 
one would expect that the weighting of the recidivists’ premiums would 
43. See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage That Is Proportionality 
in Sentencing, 25 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 411, 434 (2013); see also Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions v. G.K., [2008] IECCA 110 (C.C.A.) (Ir.) (holding that prior convictions 
inform proportionality, but only where they are of a similar nature to that of the current 
offense); Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. P.S., [2009] IECCA 1 (C.C.A.) (Ir.) (seemingly
overruling Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. G.K., [2008] IECCA 110 (C.C.A.) (Ir.)); Mahon, 
supra note 6, at 85, 87–89 (discussing these cases). 
44. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking on
Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2002); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008)















    
 
   
  
    
    
   
     
 
   
   
  
  
   
  
   
correlate closely to the incarceration rate in the respective jurisdictions. 
This is one instance where theory and practice align.45  The United States
has the highest incarceration rate in the world—nearly 750 per 100,000 
persons;46 Sweden has one of the lowest—67 per 100,000 persons;47 and 
Australia and the United Kingdom have similar rates—168 per 100,000
persons48 and 132 per 100,000 persons,49 respectively. This order, in fact, 
precisely accords with the respective weight accorded to previous 
convictions in sentencing.
B. United States—Considerable Weight Given to Prior Convictions 
As noted above, the United States is the jurisdiction where prior
convictions aggravate sentences most significantly.  The main trend of
sentencing reform in the United States since the 1970s has been a move
towards mandatory sentencing laws and presumptive guidelines;50 both
of which are severe on recidivists.  The backdrop is a growing intolerance 
towards repeat offenders and emerging evidence of high recidivism rates.51 
This is succinctly summarized by Justice O’Connor in the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision of Ewing v. California: 
Recidivism is a serious public safety concern in California and throughout the 
Nation.  According to a recent report, approximately 67 percent of former inmates 
released from state prisons were charged with at least one “serious” new crime
within three years of their release.  In particular, released property offenders . . . 
45. Although it is not suggested that this is solely—nor, indeed, even principally— 
attributable to the manner in which prior convictions are dealt with.  As indicated in Part 
I.B, supra, sentencing is a complex process and many variables contribute to incarceration
rates. 
46. This reflects a near doubling in the past twenty years.  See LAUREN E. GLAZE 
& ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1, 8 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf. 
47. ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION 
LIST 5 (10th ed. 2013), available at http://www.apcca.org/uploads/10th_Edition_2013.pdf. 
48. See AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN AUSTRALIA: 2012 REISSUE 8 
(2013), available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/24B61FAA 
213E5470CA257B3C000DCF8A/$File/45170_2012reissue.pdf. 
49. See WALMSLEY, supra note 47, at 5.  Twenty-seven percent of prisoners were 
sentenced for violent offenses. GAVIN BERMAN & ALIYAH DAR, PRISON POPULATION
STATISTICS 7 (2013), available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn04334.pdf. More
wide-ranging comparisons are found in this publication.  Weekly population figures for
the United Kingdom are updated at Prison Population Figures: 2013, MINISTRY JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/prisons-and-probation/prison-population-figures (last 
updated Jan. 10, 2014). 
50. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 146 (1996). 
51. See Mike C. Materni, Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice, 2 BRIT.
J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 263, 294 (2013) (noting the United States has nearly double the 
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had higher recidivism rates than those released after committing violent, drug, 
or public-order offenses. Approximately 73 percent of the property offenders
released in 1994 were arrested again within three years, compared to approximately 
61 percent of the violent offenders, 62 percent of the public-order offenders, and
66 percent of the drug offenders.52 
All states in the United States have habitual offender laws,53 and many 
states and the federal jurisdiction have advisory or presumptive sentencing
grid guidelines that use a criminal history score54 and offense seriousness to
calculate the appropriate penalty.55  None of these policies and practices 
emanated from a clear theoretical foundation, but rather stemmed from 
“back-of-an-envelope calculations and collective intuitive judgements.”56 
A relatively well-known presumptive sentencing system is the grid
system in Minnesota,57 which utilizes two core variables in arriving at a 
sentence. The vertical axis of the grid lists the severity levels of offenses 
in descending order—there are eleven different levels.58  The horizontal
axis provides a—seven level—criminal history score that reflects the 
offender’s criminal record.59  The presumptive sentence appears in the
52. 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 
1, 8 (2002)), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
53. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior 
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2010)
(citing Michael G. Turner et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Legislation: A National 
Assessment, 59 FED. PROBATION 16, 17 (1995)). 
54. The criminal history score is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and 
age of the prior conviction. See, e.g., OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIMER 1, 5 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/
Primers/Primer_Criminal_History.pdf. 
55. See Russell, supra note 53, at 1149. 
56. Tonry, supra note 7, at 93. 
57. The Sentencing Guidelines Grid is located at Sentencing Guidelines Grid, 
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION (Aug. 1, 2012), http://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/images/2012%2520Standard%2520Grid.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines Grid].
An explanation of the operation of the Guidelines Grid is located at Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION (Aug.
1, 2012), http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2012%2520Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 
Guidelines and Commentary].  In the United States, over a dozen other states also utilize
sentencing grids. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Other 
American States: A Progress Report, in THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 169, 171 
(Chris Clarkson & Rod Morgan eds., 1995). 
58. See Guidelines Grid, supra note 57. 
59. See id. at 57. This is determined according to a criminal history score, with 
each felony carrying a predetermined number of points, with felonies more than fifteen


















   
    
 
 





   
  
 
    






cell of the grid at the intersection of the offense score and the offender 
score.60  Where the sentence is one of imprisonment, a precise period is
indicated, as is a range within which a court can sentence an offender
without it being regarded as a departure.61  The range allows for the 
operation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances other than those 
relating to an offender’s prior criminal history.62  Sentences may be imposed 
outside the range only when substantial and compelling circumstances
exist.63  Thus, prior criminal history ranks alongside the seriousness of
the instant offense as the most important sentencing consideration.  In
Minnesota, prior convictions can mean a considerable difference in
ultimate disposition.64  For example, a first-time offender convicted of theft 
over $5000 or nonresidential burglary, a court may impose a noncustodial 
sentence.65  However, when an offender with “a criminal history score”
of six or more commits the same crimes, the presumptive sentences become
twenty-three months and thirty months, respectively.66 
The federal sentencing guidelines place even more weight on prior 
convictions. The guidelines are no longer mandatory in nature after the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker;67 however, 
sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in approximately
sixty percent of cases.68  In relation to most offenses, a poor criminal history 
can approximately double the presumptive sentence.  For example, for an
60. See Guidelines Grid, supra note 57. 
61. See id.  If the court departs from the range, the court must complete a departure
report and submit it to the Sentencing Guidelines Commission with fifteen days of the 
sentence. See Guidelines and Commentary, supra note 57, at 3, 38–39.
62. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Parsimony in American Sentencing 
Guidelines: The Minnesota and Oregon Standards, in  THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING 
REFORM, supra note 57, at 149, 151. 
63. See Guidelines and Commentary, supra note 57, at 38. For a more detailed 
explanation of the Minnesota sentencing grid system and a comparison to the Oregon 
grid system, see generally id.
64. By comparison to other jurisdictions, the Minnesota grid system is relatively 
soft on prior convictions, and the weight accorded to previous criminal history has 
reduced in recent years. See id. at 10–11 cmt. 2.B.01. 
65. See Guidelines Grid, supra note 57.  However, the presumptive penalty is 
imprisonment for one year and one day. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27, 245–46 (2005) (holding that aspects of the guidelines 
that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a trial by
jury); see also Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008) (noting that the Booker
Court found the mandatory requirement of the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional);
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (noting that the Booker Court rendered the 
federal sentencing guidelines advisory instead of mandatory); Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 354 (2007) (noting that the Booker Court found the mandatory requirement of 
the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional). 
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offense level of fourteen, the presumptive penalty for a first-time offender is
a term of imprisonment of fifteen to twenty-one months,69 which increases 
to thirty-seven to forty-six months for an offender with thirteen or more
criminal history points.70 For an offense at level thirty-six, a first-time
offender has a presumptive penalty of 188–235 months, which increases 
to 324–405 months for an offender with the highest criminal history score.71 
Thus, a bad criminal history can add between 136 months to 170 months— 
over fourteen years—to a jail term. 
Some of the harshest types of mandatory sentencing laws are the three-
strikes laws, which have been adopted in over twenty states.72  The 
California three-strikes laws,73 which were reformed in 2012,74 are the
most well-known.75  Prior to the reforms, offenders convicted of any felony
who had two or more relevant previous convictions were required to be 
sentenced to between twenty-five years and life imprisonment.76  The  
importance attributed to the offender’s prior convictions was exemplified by
the fact that the current offense did not have to be for a serious and violent
felony—any felony would do.77  This meant that some offenders were 
sentenced to grossly disproportionate sentences.  Defendants have been
sentenced to twenty-five years to life where their last offense was for a
69. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 395 (2013), available 
at http:// www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-pdf/2013_
Guidelines_Manual_Full.pdf.  The offense levels range from one—least serious—to forty-
three—most serious. See id. Examples of level fourteen offenses may include: criminal 
sexual abuse of a ward, failure to register as a tier II sex offender, and bribery. See id. at
63, 67, 129. 
70. See id. at 395.  The criminal history score ranges from zero—the least offending 
record—to thirteen or more—the worst offending record.  See id.
71. See id. 
72. See James Austin et al., The Impact of “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” 1 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131, 132 (1999); Kelly McMurry, “Three-Strikes” Laws Proving 
More Show Than Go, TRIAL, Jan. 1997, at 12, 12; Tonry, supra note 7, at 93. 
73. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2013).
74. See ELECTION DIV., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE FOR TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2012 CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION 105–10 (2012)
[hereinafter VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE], available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2319&context=ca_ballot_props. 
75. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the three-strikes laws do not violate the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution—the amendment that prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003); Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003).
76. See VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 74, at 106. 
























   
  
 
   
  
      
     
 
 
      
minor theft—which, prior to the three-strikes regime, would normally
have resulted in a noncustodial sentence.78  For example, Jerry Dewayne
Williams, a twenty-seven-year-old Californian was ordered imprisoned 
for twenty-five years to life without parole for stealing a slice of pepperoni 
pizza from a group of four youths, based on his previous convictions.79 
Gary Ewing was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for shoplifting 
three golf clubs, each of which was worth $399.80  Prior to that he had 
been convicted of four serious or violent felonies.81 
The California three-strikes law was somewhat softened in 2012, such 
that a term of at least twenty-five years imprisonment would only be 
required where an offender’s third offense was a serious or violent felony.82 
However, in the event an offender’s third offense is not a serious or 
violent felony, the offender will still receive a significant premium—they
must be sentenced to double the term they would have otherwise received
for the instance offense.83  Thus, despite the softening of the laws, they still 
provide severe penalties for serious and violent offender third-strikers. 
C. Australia—Moderate Weight Given to Previous Convictions 
Australia is also an unfriendly jurisdiction for recidivists, but it is not
as harsh as the United States.  In Australia, there are over 200 aggravating
and mitigating considerations relevant to the sentencing calculus.84  The
importance of the offender’s prior criminality is underlined by the fact
that it is only a consideration that a sentencer must be informed of prior 
to imposing a sentence.85 
As is the case in the United States, recidivism rates are high.86  The  
most wide-ranging study of the trajectory of offenders in Australia was
78. See Phil Reeves, “Life” for Pizza Theft Enrages Lawyers, INDEPENDENT (Mar.
4, 1995), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/life-for-pizza-theft-enrages-lawyers-
1609876.html. 
79. See id. 
80. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–20. 
81. See id. This sentence was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld 
the validity of the legislation. See id. at 30–31.  For a discussion of the case, see Sara
Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing v. California: Three Strikes Laws and the Limits of the 
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (Donna Coker &
Robert Weisburg eds., 2013). 
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(C) (West 2013). 
83. See id.  This is the manner in which offenders are generally dealt for second 
strikes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West 2013).
84. See  SHAPLAND, supra note 23, at 55; GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF 
VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS (1980).
85. See R v Gamble (1983) 72 FLR 352, 357 (Austl.). 
86. See JESSICA ZHANG & ANDREW WEBSTER, AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AN 
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undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and released in August 
2010 in a report titled An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment Trends in
Australia Using Prisoner Census Data from 1994 to 2007.87  In total, the
report monitored the trajectories of over 50,000 former prisoners and
noted that most of the prison population is made up of people who had
been in prison before.88  Further, it emerged that prisoners with prior
imprisonment records were twice as likely as first-time offenders to return 
to prison—approximately fifty percent compared to approximately twenty-
five percent imprisonment rates, respectively, ten years after release.89 
When it comes to sentencing recidivists, at common law, there is “no 
principle of sentencing that demands increasingly more severe sanctions 
be administered to persons who persist in their criminality.”90  However,
recidivists91 are treated more harshly for several reasons.  First, the
courts take the view that prior convictions disentitle them from
leniency, which is normally accorded to a first-time offender.92 
In Veen v The Queen (No. 2), the High Court of Australia set out three 
other grounds for imposing harsher penalties on recidivists: 
The antecedent criminal history is relevant . . . to show whether the instant
offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested
in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of
the law.  In the latter case, retribution, deterrence and protection of society may
all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted. It is legitimate to take
account of the antecedent criminal history when it illuminates the moral culpability
of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity or shows 
DATA FROM 1994 TO 2007, at 19 (2010), available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ 
ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/26D48B9A4BE29D48CA25778C001F67D3/$File/1351055031
_aug%202010.pdf; supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
87. ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 86. 
88. See id. at i–iii. 
89. See id. at 19. 
90. RICHARD FOX & ARIE FREIBERG, SENTENCING: STATE AND COMMONWEALTH 
OFFENDERS 269 (2d ed. 1999). 
91. The discussion above relates to prior conviction in a strict sense, namely, 
matters that were dealt with before the commission of the instant offense and, to a lesser
extent, criminal offenses for which the offender is sentenced after the commission of the 
instant offense. See, e.g., DPP (Tas) v Broadby [2010] TASCCA 13; R v Wilson [2009]
SASC 92 (Austl.); R v MAK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 (Austl.); R v Smith (2000) 114 A 
Crim R 8 (Austl.).






















      
    
  
  







a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders 
from committing further offences of a like kind.93  
It has also been held that a prior criminal history is relevant by showing 
that the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are poor.94 
However, irrespective of the reason that prior convictions are said to
be relevant, at common law they cannot be used as a basis for imposing
a sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity of the immediate offense.95 
Thus, prior convictions determine where, within the limits of the
proportionality principle,96 the sentence should be imposed.97 
Accordingly, the progressive loss of mitigation theory is, effectively,
the guiding principle regarding the relevance of prior convictions at 
common law in Australia.98  Thus, prior convictions operate to increase 
93. (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477 (Austl.) (emphases added).  The connection between 
prior convictions and moral culpability was also raised in R v Mulholland (1991) 102
FLR 465, 466 (Austl.). In R v O’Brien (1997) 2 VR 714 (Austl.), the court held that an
adverse criminal record may serve as an indicator of the offender’s culpability and the
community’s need for protection. See also R v Scholes (1998) 102 A Crim R 510, 521– 
22 (Austl.). In R v Maxwell (1998) 102 A Crim R 374, 379 (Austl.), the court held that a 
prior criminal history indicates a continuing attitude of disobedience that enhances the
gravity of the offense. 
94. If an offender has a criminal record, but there is a gap in the offending pattern,
this can indicate potential for rehabilitation, and hence, be mitigatory.  See Ryan v The 
Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, 288 (Austl.).  However, this is not invariably the case, 
especially when the crimes are serious.  See R v Johnson [2004] NSWCCA 76 at [29]
(Austl.).  In Saunders v The Queen [2010] VSCA 93, (Unreported, Maxwell P and Buchanan
JA, 15 Apr. 2010) ¶ 16 (Austl.), the court also noted that mitigation, which can stem 
from a deprived social background, is diminished as the list of prior convictions grows. 
95. Prior convictions are not part of the proportionality calculus. See Veen v The 
Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Austl.) (citing Veen v The Queen (No. 1) (1979)
143 CLR 458, 467–68 (Austl.)). 
96. Given the unclear nature of the proportionality principle, there is a tenable 
view that this limit is more abstract than real. See Bagaric, supra note 43, at 413, 440–41. 
97. See Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477 (Austl.); R v 
McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566, 573–76 (Austl.); see also Lang v The Queen [2013] 
NSWCCA 29, (Unreported, McClellan CJ at CL and Rothman J, 19 Feb. 2013) ¶¶ 34–38 
(Austl.) (summarizing the use made of prior convictions in the sentencing calculus). 
98. This principle was endorsed by the Australian Law Reform Commission.  See 
AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, SAME CRIME, SAME TIME: SENTENCING OF FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS ¶¶ 6.177–6.179 (2006), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/
files/pdfs/publications/ALRC103.pdf.  To this end, the courts have expressly stated prior 
convictions cannot be applied in a manner where they result in an offender being
punished again for the same offenses.  See Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267, 287– 
88 (Austl.) (citing R v McInerney (1986) 42 SASR 111, 113 (Austl.)) (“The ‘cardinal 
rule’ is said to be that, whilst ‘good character’ may operate in mitigation, ‘bad character’
cannot operate in aggravation because a person is not to be punished or punished again
for crimes other than that for which sentencing is passed.”); see also Regina v Field
[2011] NSWCCA 13, (Unreported, McClellan CJ at CL, Hall J, and Garling J, 16 Feb.
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sanction severity by either diminishing the role of mitigating factors— 
namely, rehabilitation and good previous character—or by attracting the 
operation of aggravating factors, especially retribution, deterrence, and 
community protection.99  However, the sum effect of these considerations
cannot be so significant as to take the penalty beyond the limits of a
proportionate sanction.100 
Despite the position at common law, most jurisdictions in Australia 
now have statutory provisions that substantially increase the importance
of prior convictions, especially where the prior conviction is for a similar 
offense to the current offense, which cuts across the principle of
proportionality.101 
The harshest provisions apply in relation to serious violent and sexual 
offenders who are regarded as being a danger to the community.102  In  
several Australian jurisdictions, such offenders can be sentenced to 
indefinite terms of imprisonment.103  Theoretically, the provisions can
even apply to first-time offenders, but in reality that does not occur given 
that the prior criminal history of the offender is an important relevant 
consideration in assessing the level of risk presented by an offender. 
There are also numerous provisions that impose less severe but
nevertheless harsh penalties on recidivists.  Although in Western Australia
the Sentencing Act 1995 states that prior convictions are not to be regarded 
as aggravating in relation to particular offenses, prior convictions can
99. See supra notes 97–98. 
100. For an example of where considerable weight was given to an offender’s 
criminal history, see R v Hawdon [2011] QCA 219, (Unreported, White JA, 2 Sept. 
2011) ¶¶ 21–22 (Austl.). 
101. See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
103. See Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Queensl.) s 13 (Austl.);
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas.) s 19 (Austl.); Sentencing Act 1995 (N. Terr.) ss 65–78 (Austl.); 
Sentencing Act 1995 (W. Austl.) ss 98–101; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Queensl.) 
ss 162–79 (Austl.); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vict.) ss 18A–18P (Austl.); Criminal Law
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (S. Austl.) ss 21–29; see also Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act
2006 (N.S.W.) ss 14–20 (Austl.) (offering the state of New South Wales the option to 
seek continuing detention orders against certain sex offenders). For an overview of the 
operation of these provisions, see N.S.W. SENTENCING COUNCIL, HIGH-RISK VIOLENT 
OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND POST-CUSTODY MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 12–16 (2012),


















   
 
  


















considerably aggravate the penalty.104  For example, recidivist burglars 
must be sentenced to a minimum of twelve months’ imprisonment.105 
In a similar vein, sentencing legislation in New South Wales (NSW) 
and South Australia states that prior convictions are aggravating as a 
general matter.106  Habitual offender legislation in NSW allows for
significantly harsher penalties to be imposed on certain repeat offenders.107 
Several Australian jurisdictions also have “serious offender” provisions 
that allow for lengthy sentences to be imposed on recidivist serious
offenders.108  In Victoria, for example, protection of the community is the
principal purpose of sentencing in relation to offenders who commit certain
types of sexual, violent, drug, or arson offenses—serious offenses—and
have one—or in the case of certain sexual offenses, two—previous 
convictions for similar offenses.109  In order to achieve this purpose, the
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vict.) expressly provides that a sentence longer than 
one that is proportionate to the gravity of the instant offense may be 
imposed.110  Offenders who commit serious property offenses111 are liable
to a maximum term of imprisonment of twice the length of the maximum 
term prescribed for the instant offense or twenty-five years—whichever
is lower—for a third similar offense.112  Serious offender provisions exist in
other jurisdictions as well.113 
The prior criminality provisions in South Australia are the most
sweeping. Offenders who are convicted of certain offenses after having 
two, or in some cases three, prior convictions for offenses of the same 
104. See Sentencing Act 1995 (W. Austl.) s 7(2)(b) (stating that prior offenses do 
not aggravate an instant offense).
105.  See Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (W. Austl.) s 401(4). 
106. See Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (N.S.W.) s 21A(2)(d) (Austl.); 
see also Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (S. Austl.) s 10(1)(b) (requiring that a court 
sentencing a federal offender take into account the offender’s antecedent crimes); Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(m) (Austl.) (noting that the Commonwealth’s courts must
consider a federal offender’s antecedents when sentencing the offender for the offense); 
Weininger v The Queen (2003) 212 CLR 629, 640 (Austl.) (noting that taking into 
account the antecedents of an offender during sentencing is a well-established practice).
107. See Habitual Criminals Act 1957 (N.S.W.) s 4(1) (Austl.).
108. See Sentencing Act 1995 (N. Terr.) ss 65–78 (Austl.); Sentencing Act 1991 
(Vict.) ss 6A–6D (Austl.). 
109. See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vict.) ss 6A–6D (Austl.). 
110. Id. s 6D(b); see also R v LD [2009] VSCA 31, (Unreported, Maxwell P, 
Redlich JA, and Vickery AJA, 18 Dec. 2009) ¶¶ 21–22 (applying the Sentencing Act 
(1991) (Vict.)).
111. Serious property offenses are termed “continuing criminal enterprise offences.”
See Sentencing Act (1991) (Vict.) ss 6H–6I, sch 1A (Austl.). 
112. See Sentencing Act (1991) (Vict.) s 6I (Austl.)
113. See, e.g., Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas.) s 19 (Austl.); Penalties and Sentences
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class are liable to be sentenced to disproportionately severe terms.114  Unlike
the disproportionate sentencing provisions in the other states, the South 
Australian model is not necessarily targeted at offenders who commit
particularly serious crimes.115 
Thus, prior convictions are overall a weighty consideration in the
Australian sentencing domain.  This is best underlined by a Victorian study
which showed that offenders with prior convictions are six times more 
likely than first-time offenders to be sentenced to imprisonment.116 
D. United Kingdom—Moderate to Little Weight Given to 
Previous Convictions 
Recidivism is also a major problem in the United Kingdom.117  Empirical 
data supports the view that most offenders are recidivists.118  A United 
Kingdom Ministry of Justice report on offenders sentenced in 2005 revealed
that eighty-eight percent of those convicted of an indictable offense and
seventy-six percent of those convicted of summary offenses had prior
convictions.119 A more recent report, published by the Ministry of Justice
in 2009, showed that one-quarter of offenders had fifteen or more
convictions.120 
114. See Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (S. Austl.) ss 20A, 20B, 20BA. 
115. Qualifying offenses include home invasions and firearm crime. See id. s 20A(1). 
116. SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPARING SENTENCING OUTCOMES FOR 
KOORI AND NON-KOORI ADULT OFFENDERS IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT OF VICTORIA 44
(2013), available at https://sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov. 
au/files/comparing_sentencing_outcomes_for_koori_and_non-koori_adult_offenders_in
_in_the_ magistrates_court_of_victoria.pdf. 
117. See, e.g., Alan Travis, Reoffending Rates Top 70% in Some Prisons, Figures 
Reveal, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2010, 10:31 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/ 
nov/04/jail-less-effective-community-service. 
118. See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 95 (citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 2007, ENGLAND AND WALES (2008)) (noting that the “majority of persons
sentenced in England and Wales in 2005 had previous convictions”). 
119. The findings are discussed in ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 95 (citing MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 118).
120. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING STATISTICS 2009: ENGLAND AND 
WALES 83 (2009), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/218034/sentencing-stats2009.pdf. The report is discussed in Martin 
Wasik, Dimensions of Criminal History: Reflections on Theory and Practice, in  PREVIOUS 








    
    
























   
Overall, the treatment of recidivists in the United Kingdom is slightly
less punitive than in Australia, even though the common law positions in 
these jurisdictions are similar.  In the United Kingdom, formally, offenders 
with a criminal history are not said to be punished any more severely 
because of their record; however, they lose good character as a source of
mitigation, and hence, are effectively dealt with more harshly.121  A limit to
just how much more harshly they can be punished is set by the principle 
of proportionality, which fixes the upper ceiling for the offense.122  In R.
v. Queen, the Court of Appeal stated that: 
The proper way to look at the matter is to decide a sentence which is appropriate for
the [instant] offence . . . . Then in deciding whether that sentence should be
imposed or whether the court can extend properly some leniency to the prisoner,
the court must have regard to those matters which tell in his favour, and equally
to those matters which tell against him; in particular his record of previous
convictions.123 
However, as Andrew Ashworth points out, the failure by the courts to set 
precise ceilings or give an indication regarding the extent of deductions 
that should be made for a previous good record124 means that, in practice, 
prior convictions have a far more important bearing on sentence: “the
plasticity of ‘ceilings’ in English sentencing practice enables the courts 
to declare that progressive loss of mitigation is the principle, while handing
down sentences on recidivists which veer towards the cumulative
principle.”125 
Legislation in the United Kingdom entrenches the aggravating nature 
of previous convictions. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 expressly provides
that in considering the seriousness of the current offense committed by 
an offender with previous convictions: 
121. See ASHWORTH, supra note 9, at 203 (noting the United Kingdom’s practice of 
progressive loss of mitigation does not work in practice).
122. See R v. Queen, (1981) 3 Cr. App. R.(S). 245, at 246 (Eng.) (indicating that 
the offense should put the sentence in a certain range).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. As an example, he cites the case of R v. Bailey, (1988) 10 Cr. App. R.(S). 231 
(Eng.), where an offender with an extensive criminal history was sentenced to consecutive 
prison terms of two years for the theft of women’s nightdresses from a shop and eighteen
months for the burglary of four packets of frozen fish fillets from a hospital freezer.
ASHWORTH, supra note 9, at 203–04. The Court of Appeal reduced these sentences to
fifteen months and three months, respectively—but still consecutively—after commenting 
that prior criminal history cannot be permitted to impose a disproportionate sentence. 
See id.  As Andrew Ashworth notes, however, fifteen months for “a rather feeble theft of
nightdresses” hardly seems proportionate.  See id. at 204. 
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[T]he court must treat each previous conviction as an aggravating factor if . . . 
the court considers that it can reasonably be so treated having regard, in
particular, to—(a) the nature of the offence to which the conviction relates and
its relevance to the current offence, and (b) the time that has elapsed since the
conviction.126 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 also contains dangerous offender provisions 
that empower courts to impose indefinite sentences on offenders who
present a significant risk of causing death or serious injury to people.127 
In making this assessment, the prior convictions of the offender are an
important consideration.128 
In addition, the United Kingdom has its own versions of three-strike 
laws, but they are less severe than those in the United States; the United 
Kingdom’s three-strike laws apply to a much more limited range of offenses
and the penalty enhancements are less harsh and not always imposed.129 
For example, the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 introduced presumptive 
minimum terms of three and seven years’ imprisonment for third convictions 
of domestic burglary and class A drug trafficking, respectively.130  Prior
to this, mandatory sentences had been absent from the United Kingdom 
since 1891.131  However, Martin Wasik notes that these provisions do not
operate in a mandatory manner.132 In 2007, only forty-eight percent of the
581 offenders who fell within this section received at least the minimum 
sentence, with fifteen percent avoiding a custodial sentence of any length as
126. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 143(2) (U.K.).  For discussions regarding
this section of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, see Estella Baker & Andrew Ashworth, 
The Role of Previous Convictions in England and Wales, in  PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT 
SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 185, 186–88, 
192–96; Wasik, supra note 120, at 161–62. 
127. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 224–229 (U.K.). 
128. See id. § 229. 
129. Compare id. § 151 (allowing a court to increase the sanction for an offense 
where a fine would normally be warranted for to a community sentence), with  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2013) (imposing a minimum sentence of twenty-five years or
three times the term normally provided as punishment, whichever is greatest, when
convicted of three or more serious or violent felonies). 
130. See Crime (Sentences) Act, 1997, c. 43, §§ 1, 3–4 (U.K.); see also Powers of
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, 2000, c. 6, §§ 110–11 (U.K.) (imposing same term 
minimums).
131. D. A. Thomas, The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 83, 83. 
For an overview of this act, see generally Ralph Henham, Making Sense of the Crime
(Sentences) Act 1997, 61 MOD. L. REV. 223 (1998) (discussing the legislation’s inception
and impact).




   
    
      















    
  
 
    










a result of a wide reading of the term “particular circumstances” in the
provisions.133 More generally, it has been noted that offenders with
extensive prior convictions are incarcerated at around double the rate of 
first-timers.  In all courts in the United Kingdom in 2007, forty percent of
offenders with fifteen or more previous convictions received a custodial
sentence, compared to twenty-eight percent of first-time offenders.134 
As in Australia, dangerous offender provisions also exist in the United 
Kingdom.135  These provisions enable and sometimes require the court to 
impose enhanced terms—in some cases of up to life imprisonment—for
serious sexual and violent offenders who are assessed as being dangerous.
In assessing dangerousness, prior convictions for serious offenses are a 
relevant consideration, but are not necessarily determinative.136 
E. Sweden—Little Weight Give to Prior Convictions 
The Swedish criminal justice system is interesting because the country
has managed to achieve the twin goals of low crime rates and low 
incarceration levels.137  In Sweden, little weight is accorded to prior
convictions in sentencing.138  The extent to which criminal justice policies
and programs—and, in particular, the approach to prior convictions— 
have contributed to this is unclear.139 
The main rationales underpinning Swedish sentencing laws are 
proportionality and equivalence.140  The seriousness of an offense—its
“penal value”—is determined by reference to “the harm, offence or risk 
which the conduct involved, what the accused realized or should have
133. See id. (referencing Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, 2000, c. 6,
§§ 110-11 (U.K.)).
134. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 138.  For a discussion of these 
statistics, see Wasik, supra note 120, at 181. 
135. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 224–229 (U.K.).  For a discussion of 
these provisions, see Wasik, supra note 120, at 178–80.  Recent changes to these provisions
have been made by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012, c. 
10, §§ 122–128 (U.K.). 
136. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 229 (U.K.). 
137. See JOHN PRATT & ANNA ERIKSSON, CONTRASTS IN PUNISHMENT: AN 
EXPLANATION OF ANGLOPHONE EXCESS AND NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM 25–26 (2013);
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä & Michael Tonry, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology in the 
Nordic Countries, in 40 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN SCANDINAVIA 1, 1–2 (Michael Tonry & 
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä eds., 2011). 
138. See Petter Asp, Previous Convictions and Proportionate Punishment Under 
Swedish Law, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 209 n.1.
 139. See PRATT & ERIKSSON, supra note 137, at 26.  Nordic countries also have
comparatively high levels of welfare, ensuring that even the financially worst-off live
relatively well. See id. at 66. 
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realized about it, and the intentions and motives of the accused.”141  This
penal value is mapped onto a scale ranging from a small fine to life
imprisonment.142 
There is a presumption against imprisonment which can be rebutted in 
a number of circumstances, one of which is that the offender has previous
convictions, especially if they occurred within the last four years, are 
similar to the current offense, both in terms of offense type and gravity,
and there is more than one previous offense.143  Thus, prior convictions
can influence the choice of sanction, and, further, can also affect the length 
of a prison sentence.144  However, when this does occur, the increase in 
length is “usually not excessive.”145  Andrew von Hirsch believes that the
Swedish system effectively adopts the progressive loss of mitigation
theory regarding recidivists.146  To the extent that this is true, it is clear 
that the starting point for sentences, even when no discount is accorded, 
is moderate by comparison to countries such as the United States.147 
F. Overview of Current Legal Relevance of Prior Convictions 
Offenders with prior convictions are dealt with more severely than 
first-timers in all cases in the above jurisdictions.148  Where the jurisdictions
vary markedly is the degree of harshness with which repeat offenders are
dealt. In Sweden, and pursuant to the common law in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, the extent to which a penalty is enhanced for prior
offending is kept in check—at least theoretically149—by the principle of 
proportionality.150  Legislation in Australia and the United Kingdom
141. ASHWORTH, supra note 9, at 105 (quoting BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [Criminal Code]
29:1 (Swed.)). 
142. See SWEDISH PRISON & PROB. SYS., THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF SANCTIONS (Adam
Cowburn trans., n.d.), available at https://www.kriminalvarden.se/upload/Informationsmaterial/
Sanctionssyst.pdf.
Some Further Reflections, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND 
143. 
144.  See id. at 209. 
See Asp, supra note 138, at 212–13. 
145. See id. at 215. 
146. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and the Progressive Loss of Mitigation:
APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 1, 14. 
147. See id.
 148. See supra Parts II.B–II.E. 
149. For a discussion of the conceptually challenged nature of the proportionality
thesis as it is currently applied, see Bagaric, supra note 43. 
150. See Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Austl.); R v. The 
































    
provides for a considerably higher sentencing premium for certain forms 
of offenders, notably, those convicted of serious offenses.151  The offenses
to which a legislative recidivist premium attaches in Australia are broader
than in the United Kingdom.152 
The United States deals with recidivism more harshly than other
jurisdictions. This is because the breadth of offenses in relation to which 
legislative enhancements apply is very wide; the enhancements are large
in objective terms and there is often little judicial discretion to not
impose the enhancement.153 
The difference in the way recidivists are treated compared to ordinary 
offenders is so pronounced regarding certain offenders in Australia and
the United Kingdom and for many offenders in the United States that we 
now effectively have a bifurcated, or twin-track, sentencing system: one
track provides harsh penalties for offenders with prior convictions, and
the other treats first-timers leniently.154  The next Part examines whether 
there is a sound doctrinal justification for this approach.
III. THE DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR PUNISHING RECIDIVISTS 
MORE HARSHLY
A. Two Main Theories of Punishment 
Punishing recidivists more than first-time offenders is, as noted above, 
widespread and instinctively appealing.155  This provides an explanation
for the practice, but not a justification. This subpart examines whether 
there is a rational doctrinal basis for the recidivist premium.  This subpart is,
effectively, in two parts because there are two main theories of
punishment.156  Utilitarianism is the view that punishment is inherently
bad due to the pain it causes the wrongdoer but is ultimately justified
151. See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of Australia’s 
serious offender provisions.  For the United Kingdom’s serious offender provisions, see
Criminal Justice Act, (2003) §§ 224–229 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/pdfs/ukpga_20030044_en.pdf. 
152. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text for a discussion of Australia’s 
sweeping recidivist premium.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. The bifurcation phrase is normally used in relation to offenders with prior 
convictions for serious offenses. See A.E. Bottoms, Reflections of the Renaissance of
Dangerousness, 16 HOWARD J. PENOLOGY & CRIME PREVENTION 70, 87–90 (1997).  But, 
as we have seen often, even prior convictions for not so serious offenses are sufficient to 
invoke vastly different treatment.  See supra Parts II.B–II.F. 
155. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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because it is outweighed by the good consequences stemming from it.157 
The good consequences are traditionally thought to come in the form of
incapacitation—imprisoning offenders and thereby preventing them from 
further offending, deterrence—discouraging further offending—and
rehabilitation—inducing positive attitudinal reform.158  The utilitarian 
theory of punishment has fallen out of favor for two main reasons.  The 
first is the perceived inability of the sentencing process to achieve the
utilitarian penal objectives of incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.159 
The second is the view that utilitarianism supposedly commits us to 
abhorrent practices, such as punishing the innocent.160 
The competing theory, and one which enjoys the most contemporary
support, is retributivism.  Retributive theories of punishment are not 
clearly defined, and it is difficult to isolate a common thread running
through all theories carrying this label.161  All retributive theories assert that
offenders deserve to suffer, and that the institution of punishment should 
inflict the suffering they deserve;162 however, they provide different
accounts of why criminals deserve to suffer.163  Despite this, there are,
broadly, three similarities shared by retributive theories.164 
157. See id. at 14.
 158. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 
MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 134–37 (2000). 
159. See id.  As noted below, this has shown to be only partially correct.  There is
no evidence showing that incarcerating high numbers of offenders results in less crime, 
and there are no punitive measures that have been shown to reduce recidivism.  See 
BAGARIC, supra note 21, at 132–34, 142.  However, punishment does result in some
good; it deters many people from committing crime.  See id. at 151.  Absent the threat of 
criminal sanctions, it is likely that there would be an enormous increase in the crime rate.  
See id.  The efficacy of punishment to attain absolute general deterrence arguably justifies 
punishment.  See id. It follows that the reason why we should punish offenders is because the
good consequences in the form of deterring others from engaging in crime outweigh the 
pain inflicted through the punishment of the offender. See id. at 149–51. The three utilitarian 
pillars of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence collapse into one: general deterrence.
See id. at 127–28. 
160. See BAGARIC, supra note 21, at 92. 
161. See id. at 38. See generally TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED 
JUSTIFICATIONS REVISITED (Pluto Press 4th rev. ed. 2006) (1969) (discussing the different
retributivist theories).
162. DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 16 (quoting Russell L. Christopher, Deterring 
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 860 (2002)). 
163. See Antony Duff & Andrew von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and the 
“Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 1997 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103, 107 (1997). 
164. See Jami L. Anderson, Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism, 16 CRIM. 























    
  
 
   
  
   
  
 




The first is that only those who are blameworthy deserve punishment, 
and that blameworthiness is the principal justification for punishment.165 
Thus, punishment is only justified, broadly speaking, in cases of deliberate 
wrongdoing.166  The second is that punishing criminals is just in itself— 
it cannot be inflicted as a means of pursuing some other aim.167 
Accordingly, the justification for punishment does not turn on the likely
achievement of desirable outcomes; it is justified even when “we are
practically certain that” attempts to attain consequentialist goals such as 
deterrence and rehabilitation “will fail.”168  This begs the question, is it
conventionally understood that retributive theories are backward looking,
merely focusing on past events in order to determine whether punishment is
justified, in contrast to utilitarianism, which is concerned only with the 
likely future consequences of imposing punishment?  The third unifying
aspect of most retributive theories is the claim that punishment must be 
equivalent to the level of wrongdoing.169  Thus, the proportionality principle 
is a built-in definitional aspect of many retributive theories.
While retributivism is the orthodox theory of punishment, it has been
argued that it is doctrinally flawed.170  There remains considerable academic
controversy in this area.171  However, resolution of the issue is not necessary 
for the purposes of this Article, given that the orthodox view is that the 
recidivist premium has a prominent role within both theories.172 
The following subpart considers the rationale for a recidivist premium 
first in the context of a retributive theory.  This Article then examines the 
rationale from the perspective of the utilitarian theory of punishment.  It
165. See id. at 13. 
166. See id. at 13–14. 
167. See id. at 14.  Some retributive theories assert that punishment has an 
instrumental component.  See Bagaric & Amarasekara, supra note 158, at 128–29.  For
example, von Hirsch claims that deterrence is one goal of punishment, but all retributive 
theories at least assert that any incidental aim should be a subsidiary goal and that 
punishment is justifiable even if the incidental aim cannot be achieved. 
168. R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 7 (1986). 
169. See Anderson, supra note 164, at 14. 
170. A common criticism of retributive theories is that they cannot justify the need
for punitive measures without resort to consequential considerations.  See S.I. BENN & 
R.S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 175–76 (1959).
171. See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 22–23. 
172. It has also been argued that severe penalties are justified on the basis that they
are consistent with community expectations. See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A
Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory
Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2004). However, public opinion is generally
regarded as a poor guide to sentencing policy. See Julian V. Roberts, The Future of State 
Punishment: The Role of Public Opinion in Sentencing, in  RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: 
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turns out that only utilitarianism offers a tenable basis for punishing
recidivists more harshly.
B. Retributive Rationale for Recidivist Premium 
1. Progressive Loss of Mitigation Theory 
a. The Theory Is Projected in Terms of a Discount but in Reality 
Amounts to a Recidivist Loading
The progressive loss of mitigation theory is the best known, and probably
most widely accepted, retributive rationale for the recidivist premium.173 
The theory contends that we should punish recidivists more harshly, but 
denies that it is because of their prior convictions; rather, it is because 
they are disentitled from leniency that is accorded to first-time offenders 
or offenders with minor records.174  The theory extends limited patience 
to wrongdoers. After the offender accumulates several convictions, the 
mitigation is used up and he or she is sentenced to the penalty that reflects 
the ceiling for the offense.175  Further transgressions are met with the same
penalty.176  The theory contends that it would be wrong to continue to
impose increasingly severe penalties for each new offense because it would 
give too much weight to persistence and violate the principle of 
proportionality.177  Although the theory does not purport to justify 
significantly sterner sanctions for repeat offenders—such as those found 
in three-strikes laws—it nevertheless allows for more than a marginal 
degree of disparity between sentences for first offenders and recidivists. 
Before evaluating the substantive merit of this argument, it is necessary to
examine more closely its logical form.  The focus of the theory is on giving
first-time offenders a discount, but in reality this is identical to inflicting 
173. See Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the 
Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 634 (2012). 
174. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
175. In terms of exactly how many prior convictions it takes to exhaust the 
mitigation, Andrew von Hirsch frankly admits he has no answer: “How many repetitions 
may occur before the discount is lost entirely?  I have no ready answer, as this seems a
matter of judgment even in everyday acts of censure.”  ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 
87 (1985). 
176. See id.
 177. See Andrew J. Ashworth, Sentencing in England: The Struggle for Supremacy, 7





















    
   
   
 
  
   
 
     
 
    
    
harsher punishment on recidivists.  From the normative perspective, 
treating people less harshly is less likely to attract criticism than inflicting 
pain—in this case in the form of state sanctioned punishment—or
additional pain on them.  However, in evaluating the progressive loss of 
mitigation theory, it is important to focus on its effect, not the manner in 
which it is presented.
Logically, “the corollary of allowing credit for good character should
be the principle of punishing bad character.”178  The objective point of
reference in relation to the progressive loss of mitigation theory is 
ascertained by asking whether offenders with criminal records who
commit identical offenses to offenders without criminal records receive
harsher sentences.  The answer is clearly yes.  Thus, the theory does, in
fact, seek to justify harsher sentences for recidivists.  What is important
is not the formal way in which the practice of punishing recidivists is 
promoted, but the reasons that are advanced to justify the practice.  With 
this behind us we can now deal with the substantive issue. 
b. Justifications: Lapse and Failure To Respond Appropriately 
To Censure 
Andrew von Hirsch, the main proponent of the progressive loss of
mitigation theory, claims that going soft on first offenders and offenders 
with a small number of previous convictions is justified by the notion of
lapse, which is supposedly part of our everyday moral judgments.179  He
believes that this has its genesis in the fallibility of human nature and the
view that a temporary breakdown of human control is the kind of frailty
for which some understanding should be shown.180 Martin Wasik and 
von Hirsch note that in sentencing, the “lapse is an infringement of criminal 
law, rather than a more commonplace moral failure, but the logic of the 
first offender discount remains the same—that of dealing with a lapse more
tolerantly.”181 
Thus, the concept of lapse has the virtue of forgiveness at its core, and
von Hirsch claims that this moral norm ought to be reflected in our
178. Ralph Henham, Cumulative Sentencing and Penal Policy, 59 J. CRIM. L. 420, 
426 (1995).
179. Andrew von Hirsch sets out his theory in numerous publications.  See, e.g., 
VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 83–84; von Hirsch, supra note 146, at 2; Andrew von
Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, in  PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 191, 194 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 
1998) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions]; Andrew von Hirsch, 
Commentary, Criminal Record Rides Again, 10 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 55 (1991). 
180. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 83–84. 
181.  Martin Wasik & Andrew von Hirsch, Section 29 Revised: Previous Convictions in
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sentencing system.  Further, he believes that the practice of partial and 
temporary tolerance for human frailty is particularly appropriate in the 
area of criminal punishment due to the onerous nature of criminal sanctions
and the capacity for the law to formalize such judgments.182 
Von Hirsch recently elaborated on certain aspects of his theory. He
notes further that the censure inherent in a conviction requires the 
offender to “try to comply better [with the law] in [the] future.”183  In  
pragmatic terms, he notes that Anthony Bottoms identified two ways in 
which an offender could try to refrain from reoffending.184  The first is to 
avoid situations that increase the chance of offending—this strategy is 
referred to as diachronic; the other is to exhibit attitudinal improvement
by displaying a determination not to reoffend—this is called synchronic.185 
According to von Hirsch, it does not necessarily matter which of these 
methods, or combination of them, the offender elects, the important 
thing is that the offender makes an effort of will to desist from further 
offending.186 
Von Hirsch accepts that the failure to make an effort cannot of itself
provide a basis for a wrong that is penalizable by the law, but the failure 
to make the effort of will, as he terms it, justify a sterner punishment for 
reoffending because, as a responsible moral agent, the offender has not 
altered his or her behavior despite the condemnation reflected by the 
earlier sentence.187  The discount conferred initially is supposedly grounded 
in the assumed recognition of the offender’s capacity to desist from 
further offending.188  If this turns out to be incorrect, then the discount is
not appropriate.189  Von Hirsch contends that the offender “should receive
the full discount initially, in the expectation that he will respond by
desisting. If he does not, he (gradually) loses the discount, depending 
[on] the frequency of his subsequent reoffending.”190  This supposedly
complements the lapse theory.  Von Hirsch emphasizes that the theory is 
182. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 85. 
183. Von Hirsch, supra note 146, at 8. 
184.  See id. 
185.  See id.  
186.  See id. at 8–9.  
187.  See id. at 9.  
188.  See id. at 10. 


























not about personal culpability; the rationale relates to “affording a limited
tolerance for human fallibility.”191 
Thus, according to von Hirsch, the progressive loss of mitigation theory 
is justified as “a limited tolerance accorded to human tendency to err, 
but to also the human capacity to make moral efforts at subsequent self-
restraint.”192 
However, this argument fails for several reasons.  First, it misrepresents
the nature of tolerance and forgiveness for misdeeds.  Second, indeterminate 
forgiveness has no role in a system of law that aims to protect important 
human interests.  Third, the theory misconceives the purpose and effect
of a criminal sanction—there is no validity to the claim that it assumes
offenders will put in place stronger attempts in the future to be law-
abiding citizens. 
c. Forgiveness Is Not a Legal Imperative 
Von Hirsch is correct that we often accord some level of forgiveness
to those who infrequently transgress. However, this is a discretionary 
practice, not a mandatory moral practice.  People can seek forgiveness,
but they are never entitled to it; forgiveness cannot be commanded.  This 
is the reason that few would condemn the wife who leaves her husband 
after he has cheated on her “only” once, and why those who break
friendships following a single instance of betrayal are not criticized.  The 
practice of forgiveness is not as pervasive or obligatory as von Hirsch 
suggests. In order for a moral norm to form the foundation of a legal 
imperative—such as, all first offenders should get a discount—it should 
first have almost universal acceptance in the moral domain.  “Virtues”
that can normatively be so readily disregarded are incapable of grounding 
discretionary legal indulgences.  This is evident when the supposed ideal
of tolerance for human frailty is compared to ideals such as respecting 
the property, freedom, and physical integrity of others.193 
191. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted). 
192. Id. at 15. 
193. An insistence that tolerance for human frailty is indeed a settled moral 
prescription would run head-on into the objection that this premise entails that we are 
born with a certain amount of credit points that we progressively lose.  If this were so, 
there would be no logical reason as to why tolerance should kick in only at the sentencing 
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d. No Tolerance for Serious Offenses 
Even if one takes the view that, socially, forgiveness toward people
who have not previously breached moral norms is widespread, it is
generally only the case in relation to breaches of relatively minor
prescriptions.194  The less serious the violation, the more likely it is that
forgiveness will be forthcoming.  People are rarely ostracized for their 
first white lie or breaking their first minor promise, but it can be quite a 
task patching up matters after being caught cheating with a friend’s
partner.  The key distinction between criminal law prescriptions and moral 
prescriptions is precisely that the former relate to more important and
precious human interests, such as the right to life, liberty, and property. 
In the social sphere, where a friend intrudes on those rights, he or she is 
unlikely to be showered with personal understanding.  Why, then, should
the law be more lenient?  The reason that the state is justified in imposing 
the severe deprivations that follow from breaches of the criminal law is
because the criminal law is concerned with guarding important human
concerns.195 Once this threshold has been crossed, there is no room for 
subjective judgments between the types of breaches that are bad and 
those that are really bad. They are all really bad; if they are not, they
should not be criminal offenses.196  The opportunity of making such fine
distinctions is lost in the decision to make certain conduct a crime.197 
In R v. Turner, Lord Justice Lawton stated that, “the fact that a man 
has not much of a criminal record, if any at all, is not a powerful factor
to be taken into consideration when the court is dealing with cases of this
194. See generally Roberts, supra note 7 (discussing leniency for first-time offenders). 
195. See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 1, 112–13. 
196. This follows from the claim that the purpose of criminal law is to prevent
people from doing acts that cause, or seriously threaten, harm to others.  There is no doubt 
that there is a distinction between offenses that violate fundamental human concerns and 
those that impinge less significantly on other human interests, but most conduct that is
proscribed by criminal law involves a minimum threshold of invasiveness upon the
interests of others.  Thus, criminal law in most western jurisdictions is becoming less 
concerned with regulating the self-regarding conduct of individuals or enforcing public 
standards of decency.  In most jurisdictions there are still obvious exceptions to this, but, 
in this Author’s view, such conduct should not be prohibited by criminal law. 
197. See  JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 91–92 (1973) (arguing that 
punishing—to the full extent of one’s desert—is not inconsistent with forgiveness: “For
to forgive is to refuse to nurse resentment, to perpetuate the anger, to allow the matter to
constitute a barrier in or to relationships, to take pleasure in the punishment.  This is why





























gravity.”198  This point is also endorsed by Wasik and von Hirsch: “Where
the gravity of the offence is great enough, even a first offence would seem
to fall outside the scope of ordinary human fallibility . . . .”199  Although 
these comments recognize that there should be no allowance for human
frailty for serious missteps, they draw the line too far—all criminal offenses 
are on the wrong side of the tolerance threshold. Of course, there are 
both less and more serious criminal offenses, but these distinctions are
irrelevant to the issue of where tolerance ceases.  All criminal offenses
have in common the fact that they are thought to be sufficiently serious 
to violate or threaten to infringe upon an important personal or community
interest and, hence, are more serious than the type of behavior that
commonly precludes forgiveness in other contexts, even for first offenders.
e. Crimes Under Temptation or Pressure, and Double 
Dipping Tolerance 
In elaborating on the progressive loss of mitigation theory, von Hirsch 
argues that “tolerance is granted on the grounds that some sympathy is
due human beings for their fallibility and their exposure to pressures and
temptations.”200  Thus, he claims that offenders who commit crimes under 
extreme or unusual circumstances—where people steal due to hunger or 
because they find a pile of money—are less culpable.  However, this cannot 
be used as an argument to support tolerance in sentencing only toward 
offenders with a small number of convictions.  A person who steals food 
out of hunger is worthy of mitigation, no matter how many times he or 
she does it.201 And, given that there is no evidence to suggest that first-
timers are more likely to commit crimes under temptation or pressure
than recidivists, favorable treatment of first-timers cannot be justified on
198. R v. Turner, (1975) 61 Crim. App. 67 at 91 (Lord Lawton L.J.) (Eng.) (armed
bank robberies); see also Regina v. Billam, (1986) 1 W.L.R. 349 at 352 (Eng.) (stating
that prior good behavior only has minor relevance in a sentencing decision for a person 
convicted of rape). 
199. Wasik & von Hirsch, supra note 181, at 415–16.  Ralph Henham argues that
an approach that regards the absence of mitigating factors as an aggravating factor that 
disappears completely when serious crimes are concerned is logically inconsistent.  See 
Henham, supra note 178, at 426. 
200. VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 85 (emphasis added); see also von Hirsch,
Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 179, at 193 (discussing further the idea of 
tolerance for human frailty).  But see Ryberg, supra note 12, at 47 (noting correctly that 
not all crimes are necessarily committed under temptation). 
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this basis because it is not a circumstance that is peculiarly applicable to 
all members of this class.202 
Moreover, where it so happens that first-timer offenders are motivated
by pressure or temptation to commit crime, there is no need for a first
offense discount to mitigate their sentences.  Human weakness is already 
catered to by the law of criminal defenses, such as duress, provocation, 
and necessity, and sentencing law and practice.203  To extend additional
mercy to first-timer offenders beyond these laws and practice unjustifiably
allows the offenders to double—or triple—dip on account of their frailty.
f. Capacity for People To Respond To Censure Does Not Impose an 
Obligation Justifying Punishment 
The second limb to the progressive loss of mitigation theory is that we 
should give first-time offenders a discount because criminal punishment
should recognize the capacity of people to respond to censure—the blame 
conveyed by criminal guilt and criminal sanctions—and change their 
behavior in response.204  A repeat offender, in this view, loses the discount 
because he “has chosen to disregard the disapproval visited on him through 
his punishment, and thus seems not to have made the requisite additional 
effort at self-restraint.”205 
However, even if we accept that the principal justification for punishment 
is censure, and that punishment addresses offenders as moral agents thereby
giving them the opportunity to respond by acknowledging their wrongdoing
and showing greater self-restraint in the future, it does not follow that the
failure to grasp this opportunity provides a basis for treating recidivists
more severely.  In order for us to be justified in imposing a hardship on
202. Von Hirsch touches on this issue by stating that “arguably, there might” be a 
case for increasing the number of lapses in situations of reduced culpability. See von 
Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 179, at 196–97.  He uses the examples
of repeat offenders who have limited intelligence and recidivists who are socially
deprived, but indicates that greater tolerance in the latter case is more questionable. See 
id.
203. Offenses that are committed impulsively, suddenly, or opportunistically are 
treated less seriously than those that are planned and premeditated.  See  ASHWORTH, 
supra note 9, at 169–70; FOX & FREIBERG, supra note 90, at 304 (quoting Neal v The Queen
(1982) 149 CLR 305, 324–25 (Austl.)).  Offenses committed under exceptional stress or
emotional pressure are also regarded as being less serious.  See ASHWORTH, supra note 9, 
at 170. 
204. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 84. 








      
 
  





   










   
    
 
  




others—in this case in the form of additional punishment—a necessary
condition is that they have violated some duty or obligation—be it legal
or moral.  A mere failure to avail oneself of an opportunity may inspire
others to pity or even mock us for failing to seize our chance, but it cannot 
justify their harming us. 
It could be countered that punishment aims to elicit moral reform and, 
hence, offenders are expected and required to make stronger efforts at 
self-restraint.206  But this argument is not open to von Hirsch because
reliance on such an overtly consequentialist objective as rehabilitation 
would threaten to destabilize his retributive account of punishment. 
Von Hirsch contends that the principal justification of punishment is 
censure, that is, to convey blame or reprobation to those who have
committed a wrongful act.207  Von Hirsch believes that censuring holds
offenders responsible and accountable for their actions and that by giving
them an opportunity to respond to their misdeeds through acknowledging
their wrongdoing in some form, it recognizes their moral agency.208 
In fact, for von Hirsch, punishment has a dual objective.  The other
justification is to prevent crime.209  He believes that human nature is such
that the normative reason for compliance must be complemented with a
prudential one, otherwise “victimizing conduct would become so prevalent 
as to make life nasty and brutish,”210 and that “[i]t is the threatened penal
deprivation that expresses the censure as well as serving as the prudential
disincentive.”211  Although von Hirsch believes that deterrence is not a
sufficient reason for punishment, he claims it is a necessary one: “Had 
punishment no usefulness in preventing crime, there should . . . not be a 
criminal sanction.”212  Instead, there should be other means adopted to
213express censure. 
206. Expectations, as opposed to hopes, are grounded in obligations, which in turn 
are derived from voluntary or inadvertent participation in goal-oriented practices or
transactions.  Obligations occur because they are necessary to facilitate the objectives of 
the relevant practice or transaction.  Thus, if punishment does not aim to reform, there can be
no expectation that offenders should show greater restraint after being subjected to it.
207. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 9–10 (1993). 
208. See id.  A little over one decade later, Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth 
advanced the same three premises with inconsequential changes to the first premise. See
ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE 
PRINCIPLES (2005). 
209. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 48. 
210. See id.
 211. Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT
112, 127 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994). 
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Von Hirsch is careful to point out that punishment “gives the actor the
opportunity for . . . responding [in a morally appropriate manner], but it 
is not a technique for evoking specified sentiments.”214  In his earlier 
writings, at one point, he did flirt with the notion that offenders are obliged 
to respond positively to punishment: “Perhaps . . . the offender has a duty to 
attend to the censure [of punishment] and make extra efforts at self-
restraint.”215  Von Hirsch denies that this makes him a rehabilitationist216 
because the first-offender discount is not aimed at inducing future 
compliance; “instead, [it reflects] an ethical judgment: it is a way of
showing respect for any person’s capacity, as a moral agent, for attending to
the censure in punishment.”217  He continues that the discount is lost
only because subsequent offending reveals that offenders do not “take
condemnation of their acts seriously.”218  However, this turns the debate
full circle. If morality requires that people ought to be given a chance to
learn from their errors in response to condemnation, why should this 
opportunity be confined to only their first few transgressions?  Repeated 
wrongdoing may reveal deep rooted attitudinal defects, but the notion of 
lapse is not a stand-alone moral prescription; it, supposedly, has the virtue
of forgiveness at its core, and we are still not told why this should be 
conferred in limited doses. 
Ultimately, the flaw with von Hirsch’s progressive loss of mitigation 
theory is that he fails to advance a concrete basis for punishing recidivists 
more harshly.  Criminal punishment is harsh.  In order for the community to
be justified in its deliberate infliction of pain, there is a need for it to be
underpinned by a concrete and clear rationale that is known in advance 
to offenders and potential offenders.  The assertion that criminal punishment 
imposes an obligation on offenders to improve is one person’s invention 
of how punishment should not operate; it is not a legal—or moral— 
imperative.
214.  VON HIRSCH, supra note 207, at 10 (emphasis added). 
215. Von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 179, at 196 (emphasis  
added).
216.  Id. at 195.  
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. 
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2. Other Retributive Theories in Support of Recidivist Premium 
a. Recidivism By Omission—No Justification for Obligation 
Not To Reoffend 
Numerous other retributive accounts have been advanced in a bid to 
justify the recidivist enhancement.  A similar—communicative—theory
to counter that offered by von Hirsch is called recidivism as omission.219 
According to Youngjae Lee, the receipt of an earlier penalty places
offenders in a special situation that imposes a burden on them to take
steps to not reoffend.220  Failure to take these steps supposedly justifies a
harsher penalty.221  His rationale is dependent on the view that punishment
has a communicative aspect that imposes on offenders an obligation222 to 
reflect on the matters that resulted in their committing an offense.  Failure to
put in place mechanisms to prevent reoffending is blameworthy and
therefore worthy of additional punishment.223  Lee believes that “the
recidivist premium is not about what an offender does or reveals at the 
moment a crime is committed; rather, the recidivist premium is additional
punishment directed at the previous steps taken by him that enabled the
later crime to be committed.”224  He adds, “once offenders are convicted
of a crime, they enter into a thick relationship with the state, and that 
relationship gives rise to an obligation for the offenders to rearrange their 
lives in order to steer clear of criminal wrongdoing.”225 
However, Lee does not explain the source of the obligation.  This is a 
point noted by Thomas Mahon, who observed that Lee’s theory “fails to
explain why the process of conviction confers a legally binding obligation 
on the offender to take steps to reform.”226 
Moreover, the nature of the supposed duty imposed by a sanction on 
criminal offenders is too obscure to justify the imposition of additional 
punishment. 227  This obscurity is noted by von Hirsch, who believes that
Lee’s theory is deficient because there is no specification of what duty is 
imposed on an offender as a consequence of the previous conviction, and 
there is no clear connection between the omission and the next offense— 
219. See Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 
49, 50. 
220. See id. at 61. 
221. See id.
222.  Lee terms this an associative obligation. See id.
 223. See id. at 60.
 224. Id.
 225. Id. at 69. 
226. Mahon, supra note 6, at 92. 
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an offender who changes the behavior that prompted the previous offense
may still reoffend.228  There are infinite numbers of situational settings
that can provide a spur to offending, such as alcohol use, poverty, and an 
agitated mental state, and it is not conceivable that a person can avoid all 
of them.229 
b. Failure To Apologize Cannot Justify the Recidivist Premium 
Another communicative theory that supposedly justifies the recidivist 
premium is that advanced by Christopher Bennett.230  Like Lee, Bennett
believes that previous offending imposes an obligation on the offender to
put in place measures to avoid further offending; however, Bennett 
attempts to detail the source of the obligation.231  Bennett believes that
the obligation stems from the fact that punishment is a means for expressing 
“condemnation by symbolizing how sorry the offender ought to be for 
the offence,” and the process of apologizing and saying sorry includes a
duty to reform.232  He concludes: “[Ho]w can an act of condemnation fully 
express that an act is wrong if it does not also say that the person who 
does it has an obligation not to do it again?”233  For Bennett, repeat 
offenders are more culpable because in addition to committing the instant 
offense, they have also violated the obligation to apologize and reform.234 
Current orthodoxy suggests that remorse is a mitigating factor in
sentencing; this Author has argued that this is mistaken.235  Offenders
who are penitent for their acts are behaving in a minimally decent manner 
by acknowledging their mistake.  People who do what is expected should 
not be rewarded. It is only those who exceed expectations that should be 
treated in such a manner.  Accordingly, Bennett’s theory has some appeal. 
228. See von Hirsch, supra note 146, at 6–7. 
229. See Mahon, supra note 6, at 93.  A similar point is made by von Hirsch in von
Hirsch, supra note 146, at 6–7. 
230. See Christopher Bennett, “More to Apologise For”: Can a Basis for the Recidivist
Premium Be Found Within a Communicative Theory of Punishment?, in PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 
73, 73. 
231. See id. at 88. 
232. Id.
 233. Id.
 234. See id. at 87.
 235. See Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, Feeling Sorry?—Tell Someone
Who Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOW. J. OF CRIM. JUST. 364 











   
 

















However, it fails because it confuses a community aspiration and,
arguably, a moral imperative with a legal imperative.  The requirement 
to be sorry and behave accordingly is not one mandated by the criminal
law. Sure, society would prefer if offenders became nicer people after
their transgressions and punishments, but this cannot be forced on them.
Thus, the failure to apologize cannot itself form the basis of a punitive 
disposition.236 
c. Additional Awareness of Wrongfulness of Crime—Potentially 
Justifies a Discount 
Julian Roberts suggests that the recidivist premium is justified because
recidivists are more blameworthy than other offenders.237  He believes
that the extra culpability stems from the additional awareness that offenders
have of the wrongfulness of their behavior stemming from the previous 
convictions.238 Roberts points out that first-time offenders can “point to
a lifetime of law-abiding conduct to contextualise their current lapse . . . [and
can] argue . . .  that they had failed to fully appreciate the wrongfulness 
of their conduct until they were convicted and censured.”239 
To this end, Roberts adds that recidivists “are regarded as more
culpable, more blameworthy, to the extent that their life choices embrace
offending.”240  He believes that “[h]aving been convicted and sentenced,
a person should desist from offending; committing further offences is
evidence that the offender has elected an alternate moral course to that of 
a law-abiding citizen.”241 
This additional culpability stemming from prior convictions, he believes, 
enhances culpability in a manner similar to premeditation.242  He further
notes that the case for any discount is far harder to make for serious offenses 
because, in such cases, the utter wrongness of the crime and inappropriateness 
of the crime is manifest.243 
The analogy Roberts makes between the supposed increased culpability 
of recidivists and premeditation is not strong given that, as von Hirsch
points out, many repeat offenses are committed spontaneously.244  Despite 
this, Roberts’s theory is arguably the most persuasive retributive account 
236. See Tonry, supra note 7, at 107. 
237.  See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 208–09.  
238.  See id.  
 239. Roberts, supra note 4, at 32. 
240.  ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 220. 
241.  Id. at 88. 
242. Id. at 66. 
243. See id. at 56.


















   
 
 
   
 
 
   
[VOL. 51:  343, 2014] The Punishment Should Fit the Crime 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
of the first-time offender premium.  His approach is more binary than
that of von Hirsch.  An advantage of Roberts’s theory is that it is clear at
what point the discount evaporates.  He advocates a discount only for 
first-time offenders and, as he notes, this coheres with the widely accepted
belief that first-time offenders should be dealt with more leniently.245 
Further, there is considerable intuitive appeal in the claim that repeat
offenders are more blameworthy than first-time offenders because they
have been through the system and even that has not made them change 
their behavior.246 
The claim that recidivists are more culpable because they are given 
notice of the wrongness of a crime by the previous penalty is challenged 
by Youngjae Lee on the basis that there is widespread knowledge of the 
criminal law and it is not feasible to identify offenders who were aware
of the full details of their crime from those that were not.247  In this
regard, Lee is only partially correct.  The appeal of Roberts’s theory lies 
in the perception that people are shaped by their experiences.  Concrete
experience seems to be more formative than abstract knowledge. Many
people are aware that there is a risk of being burgled or involved in a 
road accident, but experience of these events often leads to people making 
much greater steps to avoid the experience than they had before the
event. 
The fact that recidivists still fail to avoid crime after having had the 
“benefit” of going through the criminal system once and seeing firsthand 
its oppressive operation makes them—so the argument runs—more 
blameworthy than people who have not been subjected to this experience.248 
Recidivists seem to be more wickedly defiant than first-time offenders
and, hence, more blameworthy.  This is what, in my view, places Roberts’s
theory in its strongest possible light, and for its justification requires 
empirical data showing that experiences are, in fact, often determinative 
of people’s beliefs and future behaviors. 
But the question then becomes exactly what is the offender being
punished for?  Reduced to its core, the reason Roberts believes that
recidivists are more blameworthy than first-time offenders is that their
245. 
246.  See id. 
See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 208–09, 220. 
 247.  See Lee, supra note 219, at 57. 
248.  See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 208–09, 220. 
381
 
     
 
 
   
 
 








      















   
 
 
disposition to commit crime is greater; quite simply, they are of bad 
character.249 
This gets to the bottom of why tolerance is shown to people who only 
infrequently violate moral norms: such behavior is not “truly” reflective 
of their character.250  The converse also applies: at the core of the impulse to
punish recidivists more harshly is the sentiment that bad people deserve
to suffer. In our daily lives we often view character as being inherently
worthy of praise or blame, and we make judgments and decisions in 
accordance. It is generally the dominant consideration in determining 
whom we befriend, marry, be nice to, ignore, or try to avoid.  In assessing 
character we give weight not only to past deeds, but also to the values 
and norms a person holds.  Some retributivists think these sentiments should
be extrapolated into legal standards: “One visits censure or reproof on 
people, not acts—and it is this feature that makes prior misconduct relevant 
to an actor’s deserts.”251 
If a recidivist premium is to be conferred, a strong justification is needed. 
Additional punishment beyond that merited for the instant offense is the 
logical and moral equivalent of punishing the innocent unless the extra 
hardship can be accounted for within a coherent legal construct.252  It is
not clear that bad character—no matter what level of legal defiance the 
offender has displayed through failing to respond “properly” to other 
convictions—can justify this loading.  People should be punished only for 
what they do, not according to the type of people we think they are. To
do otherwise “assumes a superhuman level of insight into the individual.”253 
In a community governed by the rule of law, terms such as goodness and
badness must be defined.  And they are, in the only verifiable way possible:
people are judged by their actions, not their values or beliefs,254 and the
only relevant actions are those that infringe legal proscriptions.  To punish
249.  A similar point is made in Tonry, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
250. Von Hirsch makes a similar point: punishing recidivists more severely does 
not amount to penalizing them twice for their past crimes if “some feature of having been
previously convicted affects the basis for his present punishment.”  Von Hirsch, supra
note 179, at 191.  Once the principle of lapse is excluded, logically, there is only one 
other distinguishing feature between recidivists and first-timers: their previous convictions 
evince a character defect.
 251. VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 82.  However, he later suggests that the 
progressive loss of mitigation theory does not call into question the offender’s entire
career or character. See id. at 83. 
252. The proscription against punishing the innocent is not necessarily absolute, 
but can only be violated in rare situations. See BAGARIC, supra note 21, at 93. 
253. NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 138–39 (1980). 
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character is to engage in “moral book-keeping . . . using previous records as
an index of total moral worth[.]”255 
Thus, it would seem that character is too nebulous a trait to underpin 
criminal punishment, and that any attempt to define character solely in
terms of the number and type of prior convictions is arbitrary and an 
inapposite criterion by which to inflict punishment. 
In summary, it would seem that all retributivist arguments to justify a 
recidivist enhancement are unsound. As noted by Michael Tonry,
“arguments about omissions, apologies, intuitions and bad character that 
have been made [in support of a recidivist premium] so far are
unpersuasive.”256 
C. Utilitarian Arguments for Recidivist Premium: Logically Sound— 
Empirically Challenged
The utilitarian theory of punishment can readily justify a recidivist 
premium, at least in theory. Consistent with the utilitarian theory, it could 
be contended that the good consequences stemming from imposing sterner 
punishment on recidivists in the form of incapacitation and deterrence 
outweigh the extra hardship endured by them.257 
This is manifest at the theoretical level, and the courts have also
commonly cited these justifications as a basis for imposing harsher penalties 
on repeat offenders.  For example, in Ewing v. California, where the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Californian three-strikes 
laws, Justice O’Connor stated: 
The State’s interest in deterring crime also lends some support to the three 
strikes law. We have long viewed both incapacitation and deterrence as rationales
for recidivism statutes: “A recidivist statute’s . . . primary goals are to deter 
repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits
criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person
from the rest of society for an extended period of time.”258 
As noted above, in Veen v The Queen (No. 2), the High Court of Australia 
noted that general and specific deterrence and community protection
might justify heavier sentences for recidivists.259  In a similar vein in the
255. WALKER, supra note 253, at 127. 
256. Tonry, supra note 7, at 111. 
257. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 217–19 (1983). 
258.  538 U.S. 11, 27 (2003) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)). 






















   
 
    
 
  






United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal in R v. Gilbertson stated: “One
thing is certain, that if she goes on committing offences, the periods of 
imprisonment which will be imposed on her, merely to protect the
shopkeepers, will become longer and longer.”260 
The utilitarian argument in favor of sentencing recidivists more harshly 
potentially justifies according far more weight to prior convictions than 
the progressive loss of mitigation theory.  Under the utilitarian model,
there is no ceiling to cap the importance that should be attributed to previous
convictions, and hence, there is nothing to stop a cumulative principle 
being invoked.261 
Although the utilitarian argument is logically valid, it is not clear that 
it is empirically validated.  As discussed below, the deterrence rationale 
is misguided; however, there is some plausibility to the incapacitation 
argument. 
This Part analyzes the efficacy of punishment to attain the goals of 
specific and general deterrence and incapacitation.  There is a vast body
of literature in relation to each of these sentencing objectives.  These 
topics have been the subject of extensive recent analysis.262  The discussion 
below summarizes the main studies in relation to each relevant sentencing 
objective and current state of knowledge.263  This is made easier by the
fact that there is a relatively clear consensus in relation to each of the 
areas, with the exception of incapacitation.264 
Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing individual 
offenders for their transgressions and thereby convince them that crime
does not pay.265  In effect, it attempts to dissuade offenders from
reoffending by inflicting an unpleasant experience on them—normally
imprisonment—that they will seek to avoid in the future.266  General  
deterrence seeks to dissuade potential offenders with the threat of 
260.  (1980) 2 Cr. App. R.(S). 312, at 313 (Eng.).
261. For a retributive argument in favor of the cumulative principle, see Mahon, 
supra note 6.
 262. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions 
To Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation
Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012) [hereinafter Specific
Deterrence Doesn’t Work]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy That is 
Incapacitation: An Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent Offenders, J.
COMMONWEALTH CRIM. L. 95 (2012) [hereinafter The Fallacy That is Incapacitation];
Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work—and
What It Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011). 
263. See infra Parts III.C.1–III.C.3. 
264. See infra Part III.C.3.
 265. 
266.  See id. at 15.  
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anticipated punishment from committing similar offenses by illustrating 
the harsh consequences of offending.267 
As noted above, courts have invoked both forms of deterrence as a 
justification for the recidivist loading.268  This theoretical rationale is only 
valid if the empirical evidence establishes the efficacy of state imposed
punishment to achieve these aims.  The evidence is to the contrary. 
1. Specific Deterrence Does Not Work 
The available data suggests that specific deterrence does not work;
inflicting harsh sanctions on individuals does not make them less likely
to reoffend in the future. The level of certainty of this conclusion is very
high—so high that it has been suggested that specific deterrence be 
abolished as a sentencing consideration.269 
There have been numerous studies across a wide range of jurisdictions 
and different time periods that come to this conclusion.  Daniel Nagin, 
Francis Cullen, and Cheryl Jonson provide a very recent extensive
literature review regarding specific deterrence.270  They reviewed separately
the impact of custodial sanctions versus noncustodial sanctions and the 
effect of the length of sentence on reoffending.271  The review examined
five experimental studies where custodial versus noncustodial sentences 
were randomly assigned;272 eleven studies that involved matched pairs;273 
thirty-one studies that were regression based;274 and seven other studies
which did not neatly fit into any of those three categories, and included 
naturally occurring social experiments that allowed inferences to be 
drawn regarding the capacity of imprisonment to deter offenders.275 
267. See id. at 15.
 268. See, e.g., Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 477 (Austl.). 
269. See Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, supra note 262, at 161. 
270. See Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 145 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).  The main studies 
are summarized in DONALD RITCHIE, VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL,
SENTENCING MATTERS: DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (2011) 
and DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL 
PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING (2009), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/
A/3/D/%7bA3DB5DEB-2A53-4272-87CF-CE510D13481B%7dtbp33.pdf. 
271. See Nagin et al., supra note 270, at 144–47. 
272.  See id. 
 273. See id. at 145–53. 
274. See id. at 154–55. 























      
 
  









The last category included a study based on clemency granted to over 
20,000 prisoners in Italy in 2006.276  A condition of release was that if
those who were released reoffended within five years, they would be 
required to serve the remaining sentence plus the sentence for the new
offense.  It was noted that there was a 1.24 percent reduction in reoffending 
for each month of the residual sentence.277  This observation can be
explained on the basis that the threat of future imprisonment discouraged 
imprisonment.  However, it was also noted that offenders who had served
longer sentences prior to being released had higher rates of reoffending, 
supporting the view that longer prison terms reduce the capacity for 
future imprisonment to shape behavior.278 
Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson conclude that offenders who are sentenced
to imprisonment do not have a lower rate of recidivism than those who
are not, and in fact, some studies show that the rate of recidivism is
higher. They conclude that: 
Taken as a whole, it is our judgment that the experimental studies point more
toward a criminogenic rather than preventive effect of custodial sanctions.  The 
evidence for this conclusion, however, is weak because it is based on only a
small number of studies, and many of the point estimates are not statistically
significant.279 
The review suggests that not only do longer jail terms not deter, but 
neither do tougher jail conditions.280  Studies also show that offenders who 
are sentenced to maximum-security prisons as opposed to minimum-security
prisons do not reoffend less.281 
These findings are supported by a more recent experimental study by
Donald Green and Daniel Winik.282 They observed the reoffending of 1003 
offenders who were initially sentenced for drug related offenses between
June 2002 and May 2003 by a number of different judges whose sentencing
approaches varied significantly—some were described as punitive, others 
as lenient—resulting in differing terms of imprisonment and probation.283 
The study concluded that neither the length of imprisonment nor probation
276. See id.
 277. See id.
 278. See id.
 279. Id. at 145. 
280. Id.
 281. See, e.g., M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions 
Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity Based Approach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2007). 
282. See Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments To
Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 
48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 (2010). 
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had an effect on the rate of reoffending during the four-year follow up 
period.284 
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that subjecting 
offenders to harsh punishment is unlikely to increase the prospect that
they will become law abiding citizens in the future, just as there is no
evidence to support the argument that imposing increasingly severe 
hardship on recidivists will increase the likelihood that they will finally 
become law abiding citizens. 
Although imposing harsher penalties does not increase legal compliance,
does it have the opposite effect? Some commentators have suggested
that prisons harden offenders by concentrating maladaptive, socially
destructive, and rebellious attitudes, thereby leading to a greater inclination 
to commit crime.285  If this is true, then it would, in fact, provide a reason 
against the recidivist premium.  But this hypothesis, too, is not supported
by empirical data—imprisonment does not increase reoffending.
In a recent analysis, Don Weatherburn compared reoffending rates for
people convicted of burglary and nonaggravated assault.286  The study
compared ninety-six “matched pairs” of burglars and 406 matched pairs 
of offenders convicted of nonaggravated assault.287  The study looked at 
offenders who were convicted in the years 2003 and 2004, and each
matched pair was followed for five years or until he or she was convicted
of another offense—whichever came first.288 
The study noted that “prison exerts no significant effect on the risk of 
recidivism for burglary,” and “[t]he effect of prison on those who were 
convicted of non-aggravated assault seems to have been to increase the 
risk of further offending.”289  However, this increase was only minor and 
inconclusive.290  The study found that: 
284. See id. at 358. 
285. See, e.g., Chuck Colson, Justice that Restores: A Paradigm-Shift in Criminal 
Justice Practices, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iii (2007) (“Prisons have 
become graduate schools of crime.”). 
286. Don Weatherburn, The Effect of Prison on Adult Re-Offending, NEW S. 
WALES BUREAU CRIME STAT. & RES. CRIME & JUST. BULLETIN (Aug. 2010), http://www 
.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/vwFiles/cjb143.pdf/$file/cjb143.pdf. 
287. Id. at 1. 
288. Id. at 5. 
289. Id. at 10. 











   
   
  
   
  





   
  
   







There is no evidence that prison deters offenders convicted of burglary or non-
aggravated assault.  There is some evidence that prison increases the risk of 
offending amongst offenders convicted of non-aggravated assault but further
research with larger samples is needed to confirm the results.291 
This conclusion can only be tentative because it relates to only two 
offense categories, but it is made more compelling by the fact that it is 
consistent with the trend of research and literature reviews in this area.292 
One of the most wide ranging studies that has been conducted regarding 
the effectiveness of specific deterrence is a 1999 literature review by 
Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin, and Francis Cullen involving a review of 
fifty different studies that related to a sample of 336,052 offenders—dating 
back to 1958—that provided 325 comparisons.293  The study compared the
recidivism rate of people who were sentenced to imprisonment as opposed 
to community service, and those who were sentenced to longer and shorter 
terms of imprisonment.294 
The review established that recidivism rates for offenders who were 
sent to prison were similar to those who received a community-based
sanction.295  Longer terms of imprisonment also did not reduce reoffending 
and, in fact, resulted in a very small increase in recidivism.296  The authors 
concluded:
The data in this study represents the only quantitative assessment of the relationship
between time spent in prison and offender recidivism.  The database consisted of
325 comparisons involving 336,052 offenders.  On the basis of the results, we 
can put forth one conclusion with a good deal of confidence.  None of the analysis
conducted produced any evidence that prison sentences reduce recidivism.  Indeed, 
combining the data from the more vs. less and incarceration vs. community
groupings resulted in 4% . . . and 2% . . . increases in recidivism.297 
Accordingly, the weight of evidence supports the view that sending 
offenders to prison has no or little impact on their likelihood of reoffending;
therefore, specific deterrence or the potential corrupting effect of 
imprisonment cannot be used as a basis for either supporting or rejecting
three-strikes laws.
291. Id.
292. In the Australian context, similar conclusions have been reached in relation to
juvenile offenders. See J. Kraus, A Comparison of Corrective Effects of Probation and
Detention on Male Juvenile Offenders, 14 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 49, 61 (1974); Don
Weatherburn et al., supra note 270, at 5.
293. Paul Gendreau et al., The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, DEP’T 
SOLIC. GEN. CAN., http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/e199912.htm (last visited June 16, 
2014).
294. See id.
 295. See id.
 296. See id.
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2. General Deterrence—also—Does Not Work 
In any event, the main form of deterrence used to justify the recidivist 
premium is general, not specific deterrence.298  The data regarding general
deterrence, however, reveals a similar picture. 
There are two forms of general deterrence.299 Marginal general
deterrence concerns the correlation between the severity of the sanction
and the prevalence of an offense.300 Absolute general deterrence concerns 
the threshold question of whether there is any connection between criminal 
sanctions, of whatever nature, and the incidence of criminal conduct.301 
It seems that marginal general deterrence does not work and absolute
general deterrence does work.302  The findings regarding general deterrence
are relatively settled.303  The existing data show that in the absence of the
threat of punishment for criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would 
fray, crime would escalate, and the capacity of people to lead happy and 
fulfilled lives would be frustrated. Thus, general deterrence works in the 
absolute sense: there is a connection between criminal sanctions and
criminal conduct.304  However, there is insufficient evidence to support a
direct correlation between more severe penalties and a reduction in the 
crime rate.305 
The failure of even the death penalty to act as a marginal deterrence is
exemplified by the experience in New Zealand.306  Between 1924 and 1962, 
there were periods when the death penalty—for murder—was in force,
then abolished, then revived, and abolished again.307  The changes generally 
followed some level of public debate and were well publicized.308  Although 
the murder rates fluctuated during this period, they bore no correlation to 
298. DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 15. 
299. See RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 3. 
300. See id. at 12.
 301. See id. at 24; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:
THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973) (discussing marginal and absolute general
deterrence). 
302. See RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 12, 17. 
303.  For an overview of the literature, see id.
 304. See id. at 12, 17. 
305. See id.
 306. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60–61 (1st Am. ed. 
1971).
307. See id.




















    
     
 
 
     
   
    
   











    
the prevailing penalty, whether it was capital punishment or life 
imprisonment.309 
Similar findings have emerged in the United States.310 The absence of 
a link between lower homicide rates and the death penalty in the United
States has, however, been challenged by some commentators.311  The  
evidence used in support of a connection between lower homicide rates and 
capital punishment, however, has been debunked on the basis that the 
data upon which it is based is statistically insignificant and the evidence 
goes against the overwhelming trend of the data.  As Richard Berk pointed 
out, the main findings in support of the hypothesis that capital punishment is
a deterrent are based on eleven findings out of a sample size of 1000 
observations, where the homicide rate dropped in a U.S. state following
an execution in the previous year.312  The data are statistically meaningless
and contrary to the trend of ninety-nine percent of the observations.313 
Berk states:
Whatever one makes of those 11 observations, it would be bad statistics and bad
social policy to generalize from the 11 observations to the remaining 989. So, 
for the vast majority of states for the vast majority of years, there is no evidence
for deterrence in these analyses.  Even for the remaining 11 observations, credible
evidence for deterrence is lacking.314 
Berk concludes that what clearly emerges from the literature is that “it is
apparent that for the vast majority of states in the vast majority of years,
there is no evidence of a negative relationship between executions and 
homicides.”315 
309. See id. at 60–61, 191; see also ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE passim (4th ed. 2008) (noting that the death penalty
does not necessarily deter to any greater degree than imprisonment). 
310. See, e.g., John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact 
Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994).
311. See, e.g., Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A
Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED ECON. 569, 576 (2001); Paul R.
Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED 
ECON. 163, 190 (2004).
 312. Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà 
Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 311–13 (2005). Each observation
is the homicide rate in a U.S. state over the period of one year. See id. at 311. The 
negative relationship between the number of homicides and executions—consistent with
deterrence—is only present in situations in which more than five executions occurred in
a state in a single year. See id. at 311–12. 
Dölling et al., Is Deterrence Effective? Results of a Meta-Analysis of Punishment, 15
313. See id. at 303. 
314. Id. at 328. 
315. Id. at 313.  For a more wide ranging study with similar conclusions, see Dieter
EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 201 (2009); see also Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie 
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The strongest evidence in support of the theory of marginal general 
deterrence stems from the considerable drop in serious crime levels in
the United States over the past twenty years.316  As noted in the discussion 
below, the drop coincided with a significant increase in the imprisonment
rate. The rate of violent crime in the United States dropped by more than
sixty percent from 1993 to 2010.317 
These figures, at face value, suggest that imprisoning even greater 
numbers of offenders effectively reduces the crime rate.318  A number of 
detailed studies have been undertaken to examine and explain this causal 
connection. One analyst, Steven Levitt, has stated that up to twenty
to thirty-five percent of crime reduction may be attributable to the increased 
rate of imprisonment.319  However, it is not clear whether this reduction 
is attributable to the incapacitation of offenders—who are thereby prevented 
from committing crimes while imprisoned—or to the salutary effects of 
marginal deterrence.320  Clearly, removing more than one million offenders
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003) (finding no conclusive 
evidence that general deterrence—through stricter sentences—decreases crime). 
316. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 787–89 (2010). 
317. See JANET L. LAURITSEN & MARIBETH L. REZEY, MEASURING THE PREVALENCE 
OF CRIME WITH THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 3–4 (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpcncvs.pdf. The rate of decline in other forms of
crime was similar.  See id. at 11–13.  This is discussed further below in the context of the 
discussion on general incapacitation.  See infra Part III.C.3.
 318. See William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About 
Imprisonment and Crime, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 419, 420
(Michael Tonry ed., 2000). 
319. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four 
Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 186 (2004); 
see also William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME 
DROP IN AMERICA 97, 108 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) (estimating
prison expansion is responsible for an approximate thirty-five percent reduction in the 
violent crime rate); Spelman, supra note 318 (discussing the elasticity of incarceration).
320. On balance, studies show that a ten percent increase in imprisonment rates
produce a two to four percent reduction in the crime rate, most of which is in relation to 
nonviolent offenders. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of 
Principles of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 
U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009) (citing DON STEMEN, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: 





































    
from the community makes it impossible for them to participate in crime, 
and hence, add to the crime statistics during their period of incarceration.321 
Further, it has been noted that similar crime reduction trends occurred in
the United States’ nearest neighbor, Canada, over approximately the same
period.322  During that period, the imprisonment rate in Canada actually
fell.323 
Empirical evidence not only questions the causal link between higher 
penalties and lower crime, but also provides strong evidence of alternative
explanations for falling crime rates.  For example, it has been argued that
the fall in the United States crime rate is partially the result of an increased 
number of women from disadvantaged groups—teenagers, the poor and
minority groups—whose children would have been most likely to commit 
crimes as adults, being able to abort unwanted pregnancies after legalization 
of abortion in the 1970s.324  It has been suggested that “legalized abortion 
appears to account for as much as 50 percent of the recent drop in crime”.325 
In commenting on the research on the causal link between increased
abortions and reduced crime, Steven Levitt states:
The five states that allowed abortion in 1970 (three years before Roe v. Wade)
experienced declines in crime rates earlier than the rest of the nation.  States
with high and low abortion rates in the 1970s experienced similar crime trends
for decades until the first cohorts exposed to legalized abortion reached the 
high-crime ages around 1990. At that point, the high-abortion states saw dramatic 
declines in crime relative to the low-abortion states over the next decade. The
magnitude of the differences in the crime decline between high- and low-abortion
states was over 25 percent for homicide, violent crime and property crime. . . . 
Panel data estimates confirm the strong negative relationship between lagged
abortion and crime.  An analysis of arrest rates by age reveal[s] that only arrests
of those born after abortion legalization are affected by the law change.326 
Recent empirical research from Germany is consistent with the United 
States findings regarding the failure of marginal general deterrence.327 
At the Goethe University Frankfurt, Horst Entorf reviewed twenty-four 
years of criminal sentencing practices in West German states for
321. As noted below, some of this reduction is also attributable to more police.  See 
infra notes 335–52 and accompanying text. 
322. See Paternoster, supra note 316, at 803. 
323. See id.
 324. See Levitt, supra note 319, at 182–84. 
325. See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levit, The Impact of Legalized Abortion 
on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON 379, 379 (2001). 
326. See id. at 182. 
327. See Horst Entorf, Crime, Prosecutors, and the Certainty of Conviction 4 (IZA,
Discussion Paper No. 5670, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1835309.  For a recent study supporting the inability of sanctions to deter 
domestic violence, see Frank A. Sloan et al., Deterring Domestic Violence: Do Criminal
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correlations to the crime rate.328  Entorf sought to examine the effect of
each stage of the prosecution process, from investigation to conviction, 
on the commission rates of two specific crimes—property crimes and
major violent crimes—in order to assess their relative contribution to the 
overall effect of the criminal prosecution process on crime rates.329 The
results were analyzed by the theoretical econometric analysis methodology, 
which considered the deterrent effects of formal and informal, as well as
custodial and noncustodial sanctions.330 
The results of the research further debunked the theory of marginal 
general deterrence. It was discovered that a deterrent effect was found at 
“the first two stages of the criminal prosecution process”—charge and
conviction—rather than at the “less robust” severity of punishment stage 
sentencing.331 Entorf also found that: 
Results presented in this article suggest that crime is particularly deterred by the 
certainty of conviction. Here, contrary to popular belief, neither police nor judges
but public prosecutors play the leading role.  Extending the severity of sentences,
however, does not seem to provide a suitable strategy for fighting crime. In
particular, the length of the imprisonment term proves insignificant.332 
As a consequence, he suggests that the public policies pursued by courts 
and legislatures in the name of marginal deterrence must be reconsidered.333 
The role of deterrence must be redefined: 
‘General deterrence’ is still capable of curbing crime rates, but just by a more
rigorous application of existing penal laws rather than by reforms extending the 
severity of measures.  The latter strategy, followed in the U.S., might bear the risk 
that the prison population increases without any effect of deterrence.334 
By contrast, the evidence relating to absolute general deterrence is much 
more positive.  There have been several natural social experiments where 
there has been a drastic reduction in the likelihood, perceived or real, 
328. See Entorf, supra note 327, at 4.
 329. See id.
 330. See id. Theoretical econometrics studies the statistical properties of econometric 
procedures, including power of hypothesis tests and the efficiency of survey sampling
methods of experimental designs and of estimators.  See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & 
DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC FORECASTS (3d ed. 1991). 
331. See Entorf, supra note 327, at 30. 
332. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 





























   
 
   
that people would be punished for criminal behavior.335  The key aspect 
of these events is that the change occurred abruptly and the decreased
likelihood of the imposition of criminal sanctions was apparently the
only changed social condition.336 
Perhaps the clearest instance of this was the police strike in Melbourne 
in 1923, which led to over one-third of the entire Victorian police force 
being sacked.337  Once news of the strike spread, mobs of thousands of
people poured into the city center and engaged in widespread property
damage, looting of shops, and other acts of civil disobedience, including
assaulting government officials and torching a tram.338  The civil 
disobedience lasted for two days and was only quelled when the government 
enlisted thousands of citizens, including many ex-servicemen, to act as 
“special” law enforcement officers.339  This behavior was in complete 
contrast to the normally law abiding conduct of the citizens of 
Melbourne.340  Similar civil disobedience followed the police strike in 
Liverpool in 1919 and the internment of the Danish police force in 1944.341 
The strongest empirical evidence in support of absolute deterrence 
comes from the United States, which over the past two decades has seen
a marked increase in police numbers and a sharp decrease in crime.342 
The near universal trend of data that has outlined this link supports the 
view that more police, and hence, the greater actual and perceived 
likelihood of detection has contributed to the reduction in crime.343 
The connection is complex due to the multifaceted nature of the changes
that occurred during this period, which may also have had an effect on
the crime rate.  The changes include such things as better police methods, a
generally improving economy, and other variables such as abortion trends
335. See, e.g., Carolyn Massingham, When Police Strike: The Victorian Police 
Strike of 1923, in POLICE IN AUSTRALIA: DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 287 
(Kerry L. Milte & Thomas A. Weber eds., 1977) (describing a strike by members of 
Victoria’s police that temporarily left Victorian society without police). 
336. See id. at 287–88 (noting authorities were completely surprised by the strike).
337.  See id. at 287–92.  
338. See id. at 288. 
339. See id. at 288–89. 
340. See id. at 288. 
341. See Andrew Ashworth, Introduction to Chapter 2 of PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: 
READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 179, at 51 (discussing both the Liverpool 
and Danish strikes); WALKER, supra note 306, at 65 (discussing the Danish strike).
342. See Levitt, supra note 319, at 177 (estimating the increase in officers at about 
fourteen percent and positing that the increase might explain between ten and twenty
percent of the crime decrease).
343. For a discussion, see John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in
Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN 
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and the greater use of imprisonment.344  It has been noted that the greatest 
reductions in crime numbers occur where police are highly visible.345 
This accords with the ostensible success of “zero tolerance”346 policing in
locations such as New York City, which saw the greatest number of extra
police employed and the sharpest decline in crime.347  This trend was
evident well over a decade ago.348  In a period of only several years
following the introduction of zero tolerance policing, the rates of violent 
and property crime fell by approximately sixteen to thirty-two percent.349 
After evaluating the large number of surveys analyzing the connection 
between more police and the crime rate, Raymond Paternoster concludes:
344. See id. at 248; see Levitt, supra note 319, at 182–84. 
345. See Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of Recent 
Evidence, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 411, 421 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds.,
2011).
346. Zero tolerance policing is founded on the “broken windows” theory, which
provides that strict enforcement of minor crime and restoring physical damage and decay,
such as broken windows and graffiti, would prevent the fostering of an environment 
conducive to the commission of more serious offenses.  See James Q. Wilson & George 
L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31.  The reduction
in the New York City crime rate has largely been attributed to this policy.  See JAMES 
AUSTIN & MICHAEL JACOBSON, HOW NEW YORK CITY REDUCED MASS INCARCERATION: A
MODEL FOR CHANGE? 6 (2013), available at http://www.vera.org/sites/ default/files/resources/ 
downloads/how-nyc-reduced-mass-incarceration.pdf.
347. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 150–51 (2007). 
348. See id.
 349. See id. at 151. Grabosky notes that zero tolerance policing is not solely
responsible for the drop in crime. P.N. GRABOSKY, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, ZERO 
TOLERANCE POLICING 2 (1999). He suggests that there are numerous contributing factors,
including sustained economic growth, a reduction in the use of crack cocaine, the aging
of the baby-boomer generation beyond the crime-prone years, restricting the access of
teenagers to firearms, and longer sentences for violent criminals. See id.; see also Hope
Corman & H. Naci Mocan, A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug
Abuse in New York City, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (2000) (analyzing decades of data to 
find relationships between deterrence, crime, and drugs); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle
E. Moody, Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY
609, 609 (1996) (using the Granger causality test and eventually determining a significant
relationship between police number and crime); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence
Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW 
OF RESEARCH 1, 30–32 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (discussing research regarding tough 
policing); Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on 
Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1988) (discussing 
aggressive law enforcement); Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual
Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 545 (1986) 
(reviewing perceptual studies on general deterrence and attempting to engender new 


























       
 
    
    
   
 
   
    
  
What we are left with, then, is that clearly police presence deters crime, but it is
probably very difficult to say with any degree of precision how much it deters. 
Let us take Levitt’s estimate as a reasonable guess that increasing the size of the
police force by 10% will reduce crime by about 4% or 5%.350 
The link between lower crime rates and higher perceptions of being caught
support the theory of absolute deterrence because the reason why the
likelihood of being detected acts as a retardant to crime is the underlying
assumption that if caught, some hardship awaits.351  If rather than punishing 
offenders police handed out lollipops or movie tickets, the presence of more
police would result in more crime.352 
Thus, general deterrence does work, at least to the extent that if there was 
no real threat of punishment for engaging in unlawful conduct the crime 
rate would soar.353  It follows that the threat of punishment discourages
potential offenders from committing crime.354  This justifies the punishment
of wrongdoers.355  The evidence does not support the view, however, that
this relationship operates in a linear fashion; that is, the deterrent effect of
sanctions does not increase in direct proportion to the severity of 
sanctions.356 
Thus, although the objective of deterrence justifies imposing punishment, 
it is at best a remote consideration when it comes down to the question 
of how much punishment should be imposed.357  Absolute general
deterrence provides a justification for imposing punishment, but it does 
not justify the imposition of penalties that exceed the objective gravity 
of the offense.358  It follows that the pursuit of general deterrence cannot
justify the imposition of harsh penalties for recidivists, nor indeed any
offenders.359 
350. Paternoster, supra note 316, at 799 (citing Levitt, supra note 319, at 177). But see
Eck & Maguire, supra note 343 (arguing that these conclusions are not valid, principally
because of the incomplete nature of the data and cursory analysis involved). 
351. See RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 7. 
352. RICHARD EDNEY & MIRKO BAGARIC, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 64 (2007). 
353. Id. at 65; RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 7.
 354. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 352, at 65; see RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 7.
 355. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 352, at 65. 
356. Id.; see RITCHIE, supra note 270, at 23. 
357. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 352, at 65. 
358. See JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., SENTENCING BENCH BOOK 5503 (2006)
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3. Incapacitation 
a. Selection Incapacitation 
Incapacitation is the most obvious rationale for the recidivist premium.360 
It is also the rationale where the evidence is most complex and ambiguous. 
Incapacitation aims to protect the community by confining offenders to 
imprisonment, during which time they can no longer commit offenses.361 
The effectiveness of incapacitation cannot be judged by the height of the 
prison wall.362 Imprisonment as a means of community protection is only 
effective if but for being imprisoned, the offender would have committed a 
further offense.363  With this in mind, two forms of incapacitation have
been advanced.364  The first is selective incapacitation, which focuses on 
the individual offender, and its success is contingent upon distinguishing
between offenders who will reoffend from those who will not.365 
The existing evidence suggests that there are no techniques that can
accurately predict the likelihood that a particular offender will commit
another serious crime in the foreseeable future.366  In the  context  of  
attempting to predict future criminal behavior, people who commit serious 
violent and sexual offenses are often labeled as “dangerous offenders.”367 
360. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 331, 349. 
361. See DRESSLER, supra note 156, at 15. 
362. See Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2014) (arguing that prison might not necessarily prevent an offender 
from committing more crime).
363. See id. at 14–18 (noting that some incapacitative models assume that prison is 
not part of society); see also Colin Murray, “To Punish, Deter and Incapacitate”:
Incarceration and Radicalisation in UK Prisons after 9/11, in PRISONS, TERRORISM AND 
EXTREMISM 16 (Andrew Silke ed., 2012) (noting that for incapacitation to work, it is
important that inmates do not corrupt other prisoners). 
364. Alex R. Piquero et al., The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 359, 380–81 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003). 
365. See id. at 381. 
366. See Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 
42 MD. L. REV. 6, 11–12 (1983).  It is possible to predict that offenders who have a long 
history of minor offending will recidivate, but as discussed below, it is almost not 
economically viable to imprison offenders with this profile. See Murat C. Mungan, The
Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation, 72 MD. L.
REV. 156, 179 (2012) (noting that imprisonment is costly).
367. There is no generally accepted definition of this term, but a suitable definition 
is “the repetitively violent criminal who has more than once committed or attempted to 
commit homicide, forcible rape, robbery, or assault.”  Simon Dinitz & John P. Conrad, 
















   
  
     













       
 




    
    
A wide-ranging analysis in the 1990s of the data regarding the capacity of
any discipline to predict future criminal behavior noted that predictive 
techniques “tend to invite overestimation of the amount of incapacitation
to be expected from marginal increments in imprisonment.”368  In fact, the  
ability to predict which offenders will likely reoffend is so poor that some
academics estimated the increase in the crime rate from the reduction or 
abolition of imprisonment to be as low as five percent.369 
The heightened terrorism threat over the past decade has resulted in an 
increase in the techniques used to predict dangerousness.370  Actuarial tools
score a person’s level of risk by mapping their profile to variables that are
known risk factors.371  Structured professional judgment and criminogenic
assessment tools also use a range of variables,372 but they are designed to
be more nuanced than actuarial tools because they aim to not only predict
the likelihood of violence but also the imminence, severity, and possible
targets of the risk.373 Despite this, more recent attempts to accurately predict
dangerousness in the context of violent and sexual offenses have proven 
to be deficient.374 
In relation to the specific use of prior convictions, many predictive 
tools use prior criminal history as a key variable.375  From the perspective of
Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J. APPLIED 
SECURITY RES. 317, 325 (2011) (citing the same definition of dangerous offender).
368. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT 
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 86 (1995). 
369. See Jacqueline Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Critical
Review of the Literature, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 187, 188 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
370. See Catherine R.L. Lawson, The Utility of Predicting Dangerousness in the 
War on Terror, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 407, 419, 423 (2012). 
371. See N.S.W. SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 103, at 21–22. 
372. The LSI-R model, which is used in New South Wales, has fifty-four variables. 
See id. at 23. 
373.  For a discussion of these tools, see id. at 20–24. 
374. See Black, supra note 367, at 317.  See generally BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & 
PATRICK KEYZER, DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE (2011)
(containing articles that discuss preventive measures towards dangerous offenders); 
BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION:
POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2009) (discussing preventive measures in regard to sex 
offenders). Most recently, it has been suggested that habitual criminals and serious
offenders have a different brain anatomy than other people. In The Anatomy of Violence, 
Adrian Raine states that neuroimaging of the brain shows that such offenders have less 
brain activity in areas of the brain—the ventral prefrontal cortex and dorsal prefrontal 
cortex—associated with self-awareness, learning from past experience, and emotions. 
See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE passim (2013).
375. See, e.g., Michael E. Ezell, The Effect of Criminal History Variables on the 
Process of Desistance in Adulthood Among Serious Youthful Offenders, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
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the goal of incapacitation, the prior conviction premium is, in effect, a 
crude predictor of future propensity to commit crime.376  Ostensibly, it is
a poor vehicle, especially in relation to violent offenses.377 
A New South Wales study focused on offenders who committed serious 
violent offenses in 1994 and were released from custody no later than
2009.378  There were 435 such offenders, and the tracking showed that by 
September 2011 seventy-three of the 435 offenders committed another 
offense involving a serious degree of violence—meaning that 83.2 percent 
did not commit another serious violent offense.379 
The results are similar to those from an earlier New Zealand study.380 
A study tracked the offending behavior of 613 offenders released from
prison in New Zealand for a two-and-a-half year period.381  The study
revealed that those who would be classified as serious offenders382 were
no more likely to receive a further conviction within two-and-a-half years 
after release than ordinary offenders, and were, in fact, less likely to be 
imprisoned within that time.383  It was also found that of all serious offenses
committed by the entire sample group, the vast majority were committed 
by offenders who were imprisoned for non-serious—ordinary—offenses.384 
In total, only thirty of the sample of 613 offenders committed a serious 
offense within the follow up period.385  And, it was noted that there is very 
little hope of achieving crime control through altering the definition of a
serious offense.386 
376. See id. at 44. 
377. For a summary of the literature, see MICHAEL E. EZELL & LAWRENCE E. COHEN,
DESISTING FROM CRIME: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN LONG-TERM CRIME PATTERNS OF 
SERIOUS CHRONIC OFFENDERS (2005); Kathleen Auerhahn, Conceptual and Methodological 
Issues in the Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2006); 
Ezell, supra note 375; Lila Kazemian, Assessing the Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing
Premium on Crime and Recidivism Rates, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING:
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 227, 231–36. 
378. This included sexual offenses.  See N.S.W. SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 
103. 
379. Id. at 31. 
380. See Mark Brown, Serious Violence and Dilemmas of Sentencing: A Comparison
of Three Incapacitation Policies, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 710, 714. 
381. Id. 
382. On the basis of the current definition in the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (N.Z.), 
this relates to crimes of serious violence, such as manslaughter, wounding, and robbery.
383. 
384.  Id. at 714.  
Brown, supra note 380, at 713–14. 
385. Id.


















     
      
 
   
  
  
         
 
   
  
  
   
   
      
    
  
    
 
The fact that there are so many false positives in a process of selective 
incapacitation does not necessarily mean it is flawed.387  Even if the practice
is only, say, one-fifth accurate, it still thwarts a large number of crimes in
absolute terms.388  It is potentially an attractive proposition to the utilitarian 
eye.389  However, the cost in terms of unnecessarily imprisoning offenders
is arguably too high; imprisoning five people to prevent one person from 
committing a crime offends against deeply and widely held libertarian 
beliefs.390  There is a strong moral repugnance to imprisoning individual
offenders for any longer than is commensurate with their wrongdoing.391 
In fact, any additional punishment is akin to punishing the innocent.392 
Thus, the goal of selective incapacitation has pragmatic and normative
obstacles so far as serious offenses are concerned. 
However, predicting minor offending is easier.  If one focuses solely 
on the total number—as opposed to type—of previous convictions, there 
is a far greater ability to predict future offenders.393  Studies in the United 
Kingdom have shown that male offenders with five or more previous 
convictions have an eighty-seven percent chance of being convicted of 
another offense within six years.394  Similar findings have also been 
reported in Australia.395  According to the Australian Institute of Criminology,
approximately two-thirds of sentenced offenders received into prison
387. See KATHLEEN AUERHAHN, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 67 
(2003) (citing PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 
27, 92 (1982)). 
388. See id. at 68. 
389. See Michael Tonry, Selective Incapacitation: The Debate over Its Ethics, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 179, at 128, 136. 
390. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 85–96 (1998), available 
at http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp; Erik Luna, Traces of a Libertarian Theory
of Punishment, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 264, 293–94 (2007). 
391. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J.
753, 759 (2002). 
392. This is illustrated most profoundly by the maxim that “it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
352 (1769). But, for arguments in support of limited forms of preventive detention, see 
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 208, at 55–56 (limiting it to offenders who have 
been convicted previously of serious offenses); Black, supra note 367, at 322–23. 
393. See ASHWORTH, supra note 9, at 199. Other predictive factors for recidivism 
are unemployment and drug history. See Andrew von Hirsch, Selective Incapacitation:
Some Doubts, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note
179, at 121, 125. 
394. See G.J.O. PHILLPOTTS & L.B. LANCUCKI, STATISTICAL DEP’T, HOME OFFICE, 
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS, SENTENCE AND RECONVICTION: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF A SAMPLE
OF 5000 OFFENDERS CONVICTED IN JANUARY 1971, at 16 (1979). 
395. See JOHN WALKER, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, PRISON SENTENCES IN 
AUSTRALIA: ESTIMATES OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO PRISON IN 
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already served a sentence of imprisonment.396  The results also indicated 
that previous detention is not a strong indicator regarding future propensity
to commit serious offenses.397  About half of those convicted of serious
offenses had not previously served a prison term.398  However, about ninety 
percent of those sent to prison for “other good order” offenses and almost 
eighty percent of those sent to prison for “justice/security offences”—mainly
breaches of court orders—were serving a repeat term.399 
Thus, for repeat minor offenses, the normative obstacles to enhanced
prison terms are less significant but the pragmatic concerns are elevated. 
Although we can predict with a high degree of confidence that such 
offenders will continue to cause a nuisance to the community, detaining 
them for a period significantly longer is likely to be grossly disproportionate
to the financial cost of the detention.400  The cost of imprisonment varies 
considerably in each jurisdiction.401  In the United States, it costs
approximately $34,000 per inmate per year.402  The cost in Australia is 
much higher; it cost approximately $79,000 per year to detain each 
396. Id.; see also  ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 86, at 32 (noting that offenders 
previously in jail were nearly twice as likely to be imprisoned following release). 
397. 
398.  See id.  
See WALKER, supra note 404, at 6. 
 399. See id.
400. It was essentially for this reason that the Australian Law Reform Commission
rejected the use of incapacitation—and general deterrence—as a proper objective of 
sentencing. AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, SENTENCING xix (1988).  About a decade later,
however, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission considered incapacitation an
appropriate rationale for sentencing.  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, SENTENCING 330– 
32 (1996).
401. In England, a prisoner may cost between £26,000 and £37,000 a year.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, COSTS PER PLACE AND COSTS PER PRISONER BY INDIVIDUAL PRISON 
4 (2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/218347/prison-costs-summary-10-11.pdf.  In California, the cost in 2008 to
2009 was approximately $47,000.  See California’s Annual Costs To Incarcerate an 
Inmate in Prison, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_ 
inmatecost (last visited June 22, 2014). 
402. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AT AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION 




















    
     
  
     
  
   






   
  
 
prisoner between 2010 and 2011.403  It is illogical for any community to 
expend nearly $80,000 per year in order to punish minor crime.404  
b. General Incapacitation 
Although selective incapacitation does not work, general incapacitation is
more effective in reducing crime.405 General incapacitation involves
imprisoning offenders simply because they have committed a criminal
offense on the basis that while in prison they cannot inflict harm in the 
general community.406  Little or no effort is normally made to predict future
offending patterns, whether on the basis of previous criminal history or
other considerations.407  There is no bright line between selective and 
general incapacitation, and the difference is often a simply one of degree.408 
Once large numbers of offenders are imprisoned on the basis of predictive
criteria, which are demonstrably inaccurate, a process that may have
initially had the appearance of selective incapacitation turns into a system of
general incapacitation.409  In reality, the practice of imposing a large
recidivist premium has evolved into a scheme of general incapacitation.410 
There are two theoretical reasons why general incapacitation should
work. First, the more people who are in prison, the fewer people there 
will necessarily be who could commit crime in the general community. 
Accordingly, it should follow that this will reduce the crime rate in
absolute terms.  It should also reduce crime in a relative sense.  This is
because, as expanded upon in Part IV below, people who commit crime
are disproportionately from one sector of the community: the lower 
socioeconomic group.411  Poor people are grossly over represented in jails
403. STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF GOV’T SERV. PROVISION, AUSTL. GOV’T 
PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, 1 REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES 2012 Table 8A.7 (2012), 
available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/114940/24-government-
services-2012-chapter8.pdf. 
404. See Mirko Bagaric, Instant Justice? The Desirability of Expanding the Range 
of Criminal Offences Dealt With on the Spot, 24 MONASH U. L. REV. 231, 270–71 (1998). 
A similar conclusion was reached in Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much
Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 302–03 (2012).  
There are no accurate recent studies measuring the cost of crime. For the results of earlier
studies, see Cassell, supra note 172, at 1032–35. 
405. For a discussion regarding the distinction between special and collective 
incapacitation, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 368, at 60–75. 
406. See id. at 60.
 407. See id.  An exception is the Dutch law discussed below, which is aimed at 
recidivists with ten prior convictions.  See infra notes 442–47 and accompanying text. 
408. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 368, at 67. 
409.  See id. at 69–70. 
410. See id. at 70.
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across the world.412  Thus, imprisoning large numbers of poor people should 
reduce not only the number of criminal offenses, but also the number of
crimes per non-prison population.
Most of the research regarding testing the general incapacitation 
model was undertaken in the United States, presumably because of its 
unprecedented increases in prison populations over the past thirty years.413 
Early findings were not positive.414 
Following the introduction of tougher sentencing laws, the prison 
population in California in the ten-year period from 1980 to 1990 “more 
than tripled,” representing an increase of 120,000 prisoners.415  This  
increase was “without precedent in the statistical record of imprisonment 
in the Western world.”416  Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins compared
California’s movements in crime rates and incarceration levels between
1980 and 1990 with those of sixteen other American states that contain 
metropolitan areas with populations in excess of 350,000.417  This was  
done in order to control temporal trends in California that are not connected 
to changes in incarceration policy.418  The data failed to show a general
causal connection between an increased use of incarceration and a 
reduction in crime, and in particular, there was no meaningful evidence
of such a connection in California.419  It was found that the “correlation
412. See STEVEN BOX, RECESSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 96 (1987) (concluding 
that income inequality is strongly related to crime after reviewing sixteen major studies 
between income inequality and crime); Pat Carlen, Crime, Inequality, and Sentencing, in
A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 211, at 306, 311.  Prison numbers illustrate this 
quite graphically.  In Australia, the rate of indigenous imprisonment is fourteen times 
higher than that of the general population. See AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, CORRECTIVE 
SERVICES 6 (2011), available at http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/
9A0865837AEBACA9CA2578AF0011B147/$File/45120_mar%202011.pdf. 
413. See Incarceration, SENT’G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/
page.cfm?id=107 (last visited June 22, 2014). 
414. See infra notes 424–40 and accompanying text. 
415. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? 
Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 109 (1998) 
(citing ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 368, at 104). It may be argued that three-strikes
statutes, in fact, pursue a policy of selective incapacitation, in that they attempt to take 
out of circulation the small percentage of the criminal population whom it is assumed 
commit most of the crimes.  See id. at 103. However, the net is cast so widely that, in 
effect, they represent a system of general incapacitation. See id. at 131–33. 
416. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 368, at 104. 
417.  Id. at 103–04. 
418. Id. at 105. 
















   
     






    
 
   
       
  
   
  
   
   
  
  
   
       
      
      
 
    
 
  
between variations in incarceration and in aggregate crime is –0.09, a
minute (and statistically insignificant) negative correlation.”420 
These findings extended to early assessments of the three-strikes laws
in California.421  A study published in the mid-1990s by Lisa Stolzenberg 
and Stewart D’Alessio analyzed the impact of California’s three-strikes
laws in the ten largest cities in the state.422  California was chosen as an
ideal location because (a) it was one of the first places to implement
mandatory three-strikes laws; (b) over 3000 people were charged under 
the California three-strike laws; and (c) it had implemented one of the
toughest three-strike laws in the United States.423 
It was anticipated that these laws, by effectively removing career
criminals from society, would result in a significant reduction in crime.424 
A 1994 RAND Corporation study, for example, predicted that serious 
crime in California would drop by twenty-eight percent, reaching a peak 
reduction of approximately 400,000 violent crimes in 2000.425  However, 
another study showed that, at that time, California’s three-strikes law had
no observable influence on the serious crime rate and “did not achieve its
objective of reducing crime, through either deterrence or incapacitation.”426 
Only one city, Anaheim, exhibited a substantial reduction in the serious
crime rate, but even that was regarded as possibly being an aberrant
finding.427 
“Most studies of incapacitation suggest that prison exerts a significant 
suppression effect on crime; however, the estimated effects appear to
420. Id. at 107. 
421. See, e.g., Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, “Three Strikes and You’re 
Out”: The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime
Rates, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 457, 464–65 (1997). Three-strikes laws were first 
introduced in Washington in 1993, and they have now been adopted in more than twenty
states. See Elsa Y. Chen, Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends
in California and Throughout the United States, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345, 345,
349 (2008); Kevin E. McCarthy, Recent Developments on Washington State’s “Three
Strikes” Law, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-
R-0006.htm. 
422. See Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, supra note 421, at 459. 
423. See id. Initially, California’s three-strike laws covered twenty-eight different 
“serious” felonies, including burglary, and seventeen “violent” felonies, including robbery in
an inhabited house.  See Mark W. Owens, California’s Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times
Require Desperate Measures—But Will It Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881, 891 nn.62–63 (1995). 
424. See Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, supra note 421, at 458.
 425. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: ESTIMATED
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA’S NEW MANDATORY-SENTENCING LAW 18, 23, 26 (1994). 
It was estimated that most of the drops would be in burglary and assault. See id. at xii.
 426. Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, supra note 421, at 467; see also  JAMES AUSTIN ET 
AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF STRIKE 
LAWS 103 (2000) (finding California’s three-strikes law had limited effect).
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vary markedly from study to study.”428  For example, a 1986 study by
the National Research Council (NRC) found that the rate of imprisonment 
prevailing in the United States during the 1970s would have had an 
incapacitation benefit of twenty percent.429  On the other hand, a United
Kingdom study of incapacitation by Roger Tarling estimated the
incapacitation benefit of imprisonment in the United Kingdom in the 
mid-1980s between 7.3 and 9.0 percent.430  “Although the estimates 
reported by [the NRC] and Tarling differ significantly, most incapacitation 
studies conclude that large increases in the prison population only 
produce fairly modest reductions in crime.”431  For example, research
suggests that in a majority of the states in the United States, the prison 
population would have to be more than doubled to obtain a ten percent 
reduction in crime.432 
However, more recent studies have suggested that the continued practice
of tough sentencing can reduce crime.433  This is especially in relation to 
studies undertaken over a longer period.  In the United States, between
1993 and 2010, the rate of violent crime in the United States dropped by
more than sixty-three percent, with most of the decline recorded after 1996, 
and the violent victimization rates per 1000 people aged twelve years or 
older dropped seventy-six percent.434 
During this period the imprisonment rate rose from approximately 1.37
million to 2.27 million prisoners.435  At face value, these figures suggest 
428. Don Weatherburn et al., How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation
Effect of Prison on Burglary, 2 INT’L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT’G 8, 13 (2006). 
429. Id. (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER 
CRIMINALS 123 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986)). 
430. Id. (citing ROGER TARLING, ANALYSING OFFENDING: DATA, MODELS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 145 (1993)).
431. Id.
 432. Id. (citing Janet Chan, The Limits of Incapacitation as a Crime Control Strategy, 
NEW S. WALES BUREAU CRIME STAT. & RES. CRIME & JUST. BULLETIN (Sept. 1995),
http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/documents/pdf/cjb25.pdf).
433. See LAURITSEN & REZEY, supra note 317, at 3–4. 
434. See id.
 435. Compare TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1993, at 1 (1995), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus93ex.pdf (citing 
a 1.37 million figure that includes inmates in both local jails and State and federal
prisons), with LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf (citing a 2.27 million figure that also
























        
    
  
 









a causal link between imprisoning greater numbers of offenders and an
effective reduction in the crime rate.
William Spelman has calculated that up to twenty percent of crime 
reduction is attributable to the increased rate of imprisonment.436  Other
studies support the success of incapacitation, but remain equally unclear
about its precise impact.  According to literature examined by Roger Warren, 
a ten percent increase in imprisonment rates produces a two to four percent 
reduction in the crime rate; however, most of this relates only to nonviolent
offenses.437 
Although general incapacitation seems to have some validity, one 
constant finding is that it is usually most effective in relation to minor 
crime,438  However, some success might also be achieved in relation to 
more serious forms of offending.
The effectiveness of general incapacitation for relatively minor
offenses is supported by an Australian study published in 2006 by Don
Weatherburn et al., entitled How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The 
Incapacitation Effect of Prison on Burglary.439 The study measured the
impact of imprisonment on burglary rates and concluded that:
[A]t least so far as burglary is concerned, prison does seem to be an effective 
crime control tool.  Our best estimate of the incapacitation effect of prison on
burglary (based on the assumption that burglars commit an average of 38 burglaries
per year when free) is 26 per cent. This estimate does not appear to be overly
sensitive to the value of offending frequency we assume. . . .
 These percentage effects might not seem large but in absolute terms an
incapacitation effect of 26 per cent is equivalent to preventing over 44,700 
burglaries per annum.440 
However, the report then noted that the cost associated with using 
imprisonment as a tool to reduce the burglary rate was too high:
The fact that prison is effective in preventing a large number of burglaries raises
the question of whether increased use of imprisonment would be an effective 
way of further reducing the burglary rate.  Our findings on this issue, like those 
of incapacitation studies in Britain and the United States, are not that encouraging.
They suggest that a doubling of the sentence length for burglary would cost an
additional $26 million per annum but would only reduce the annual number of 
burglaries by about eight percentage points. A doubling of the proportion
of convicted burglars would produce a larger effect (about 12 percentage points) but
only if those who are the subject of our new penal policy offend as frequently as
436. See Spelman, supra note 318, at 469; see also Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, 
The Recent Rise and Fall of American Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra
note 319, at 2 (discussing that the crime drop correlates to an increase in imprisonment).
437. See Warren, supra note 320, at 594 (citing STEMEN, supra note 320, at 5). 
438. See Weatherburn et al., supra note 428, at 23–24. 
439. See id.
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those who are currently being imprisoned. Given what we know about the
frequency of offending amongst burglars who do not currently receive a prison
sentence, this seems highly unlikely.441 
Similar findings are reported regarding sentence enhancements imposed
on offenders in the Netherlands.442  A law passed in 2001 required increased 
sentence severity for offenders who had ten or more prior convictions.443 
A key distinction between the enhancements imposed by these laws and 
those in some other jurisdictions was that they were relatively minor— 
no typically two years’ imprisonment.444 By 2007, 1400 offenders were 
sentenced under this regime, most of whom were nonviolent offenders.445 
The result was a dramatic drop in the rate of burglary and car theft in the
ten cities in which the law operated.446  The report concluded:
We find that sentence enhancements for a carefully selected group of prolific 
offenders can dramatically reduce the crime rate. . . . Although the group of
offenders sentenced under the law accounted for only 5% of the prison
population 6 years after its introduction, the sentencing policy lowered the rate 
of burglary and theft from car by an estimated 25% on average and by 40% in
the cities that applied the law most intensively. . . .
On average, we find the benefits of the policy to exceed the costs by a large
margin. We find the benefits to go down rapidly with a more intensive use of
the law, however.  The marginal crime-reducing effect of convicting another 
prolific offender to a enhanced prison sentence declines by some 25% when
going from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the rate of application of the law
during 2001–7.  The benefits of the policy remained higher than the costs, however, 
even for the cities which used the law most intensively.447 
More wide ranging data also supports the link between prior and future 
offending and confirm that the link is strongest in relation to minor
offending.  The most wide ranging study of the trajectory of offenders in 
Australia was undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and released
in August 2010 in a report titled An Analysis of Repeat Imprisonment 
441. Id. at 24. 
442. Ben Vollaard, Preventing Crime Through Selective Incapacitation, 123 ECON. 
J. 262 (2012). 
443. Id. at 264.  In absolute terms, the increase was not drastic; the habitual offender
law allowed for sentences of imprisonment of two years, as opposed to two months, to
be imposed in most cases. See id. 
444. See id.
 445. Id.
 446. See id. at 269. 




      
 
 


























    
 
  
Trends in Australia Using Prisoner Census Data from 1994 to 2007.448 
The report is based on a fourteen-year longitudinal study for the period 
of July 1, 1994, to June 30, 2007.449  The study grouped prisoners into two
cohorts.450  The first consisted of 28,584 prisoners released between July 
1, 1994, and June 30, 1997.451  The second was composed of 26,696 
prisoners released between July 1, 2001, and June 30, 2004.452  The study
compared recidivism rates from both cohorts within three years from
release.453  It also examined the ten-year reimprisonment rate for the earlier
cohort.454 
The report noted that from 1994 to 2007, the number of prisoners with 
prior imprisonment grew at an average rate of 3.2 percent each year.455 
However, at the national level, no clear trend was apparent; the rate ranged
from fifty-six percent to sixty-two percent during the same period.456 
The data on the portion of released prisoners who return to imprisonment 
within the respective three-year periods are even more illuminating.  The 
report noted that for the 1994 to 1997 cohort, about twenty percent were 
reimprisoned within two years, one-quarter were reimprisoned within 
three years, and forty percent were reimprisoned by the end of the ten-
year survey period.457  A surprising finding was that prisoners released in 
the later cohort were more likely to be reimprisoned than the earlier cohort 
over an equivalent three-year follow up period.458  The reimprisonment
rate for the latter cohort was seventeen percent higher than for the earlier 
459one. 
Thus, much of the prison population is made up of people who have 
been in prison before. Moreover, it emerged that prisoners with prior 
imprisonment were twice as likely as first-timers to return to prison—fifty 
percent compared to twenty-five percent imprisonment rates, respectively,
from ten years after release.460  When a logistic regression was applied to 
448. ZHANG & WEBSTER, supra note 86. 
449. Id. at i.
 450. Id. at i–ii.
 451. Id. at 10. 
452. Id. at ii, 15.
 453. Id.
 454. Id.
 455. Id. at 12. 
456. Id.
 457. Id. at 16. 
458. Id. at 27. For a discussion of these implications, see infra Part IV. 
459. Id. at 25.  More recent data, however, indicates that the imprisonment rate is, 
in fact, even higher.  A report by the Australian Government Productivity Commission 
showed that forty percent of prisoners released during the 2010–2011 financial year
returned to prison with two years. See STEERING COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF GOV’T SERV.
PROVISION, supra note 403, at C.22. 
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this data, it emerged that the odds ratio that a prisoner with a number of 
previous prison terms would be imprisoned was 2.9 times that of a first-
time prisoner.461  Thus, it does appear that first-time offenders are less likely 
to be reimprisoned than repeat prisoners. 
When examining trends by offense type for the 1994 to 1997 release 
cohort, it was noted that by June 30, 2007, the offenders who were most 
commonly reimprisoned were those sentenced for burglary—fifty-eight 
percent—theft—fifty-three percent—and robbery—forty-five percent; 
least were those convicted of drug offenses—twenty-four percent—and 
sexual assault—twenty-one percent.462 
The recidivism levels ascertained by this report are high, but, in reality, 
are likely considerably higher.  The report did not focus on released
offenders who committed crimes for which they were not imprisoned 
and, therefore, not recorded. The report also noted that prisoners who
were released after being sentenced for burglary or theft had the highest 
rate of reimprisonment, whereas those serving time for drug or sex offenses 
had the lowest reimprisonment rates.463  Thus, there is a clear link between 
previous offending and an enhanced risk of future offending. This link
justifies extra steps being taken to prevent offenders from committing 
further offenses. As we have seen, taking large numbers of people with
prior convictions out of the community will reduce the crime rate.
4. Discussion Regarding Incapacitation as Justifying 
Recidivist Enhancement 
The complex question then becomes what response is appropriate and
can be adapted to the above findings? The matter is complicated by the 
fact that prior offending is a stronger indicator of future offending in relation 
to minor, as opposed to serious, offenses.464  In relation to relatively minor
offenses, incapacitation works.465 Although selectively confining individuals
clearly disables them from committing further offenses in the community
for a period of time, it almost certainly does not justify the unrestrained
use of imprisonment as a prophylactic against crime.  These offenders 
should be subjected to an incapacitative penalty, but governments need 
461.  Id. at 23. 
462.  Id. at 30. 
463.  Id. 
464.  See supra notes 393–99 and accompanying text. 
465. 
409
 See supra notes 438–40 and accompanying text. 
 









   
 
   
      
 
  











to develop more intelligent alternatives to imprisonment that can
monitor the activities of recidivist minor offenders at a fraction of the 
cost of imprisonment.466 
In relation to serious offending, selective incapacitation seems to be
flawed given the limits of predicting serious offending on the basis of prior 
convictions; however, there is stronger evidence that general incapacitation 
does work in relation to those offenses.467  Although most serious offenders 
do not reoffend, individuals with previous convictions for serious offenses 
commit such crime at a much greater frequency than the rest of the criminal 
population. Further, offenders with prior convictions for serious offenses 
reoffend more frequently than first-time offenders.468 
This leaves policymakers with a difficult choice.  Ultimately, the issue 
comes down to ascertaining the level and nature of risk and the appropriate
burden placement—whether it should fall on the offender or prospective 
victims in the general community. 
There is a degree of unfairness associated with imprisoning offenders
for longer than is commensurate with the severity of their instant offense.469 
However, it would be remiss of legislatures not to take all reasonable steps
to prevent innocent people from being victimized.  The fact that potential
victims cannot be identified in advance does not negate the need to put in
place mechanisms to limit serious encroachments on the human rights of 
citizens.  Thus, the debate about incapacitation as an appropriate sentencing 
goal is not about balancing the utilitarian benefit of community safety
against the right to liberty of offenders.  It is about weighing competing
rights: the liberty of offenders against the right to sexual and physical
integrity of prospective victims. 
In relation to risk allocation decisions, the weight of the burden should
be disproportionately shouldered by the morally and legally culpable— 
the offenders—as opposed to the innocent potential victims who have
not played any role in creating the dilemma.  The rights of the innocent 
trump those of the guilty, assuming the rights are of approximately equal
importance. 
Thus, the deprivation of liberty occasioned by longer sentences for
recidivists is justified as a means of increasing the protection of the bodily 
and sexual integrity of other individuals.  However, this does not justify 
greatly enhanced penalties.  The balance that is appropriate must be
466. For suggestions of alternatives, see The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation, supra
note 262, at 123–24. 
467. See supra Part III.C.3.
 468. See supra notes 448–63 and accompanying text. 
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proportionate to the objective that is sought, and not gratuitously overreach
to satisfy the instinct to punish repeat offenders. 
There is insufficient empirical data to enable accurate and forensic
choices to be made about how much extra jail time should be imposed
on recidivists. However, at some point there is a diminishing marginal 
return in terms of offenses prevented for each year of jail time. In
addition, in any decisionmaking calculus, certain consequences—in the 
form of additional jail time—need to carry more weight than speculative 
outcomes—in the form of whether or not a particular offender would
have actually reoffended.  Therefore, the recidivist loading for serious 
offenses should be relatively minor, say twenty to fifty percent,470 and 
certainly nowhere near the oppressive levels that are manifest in some
sentencing grids and three-strikes regimes.
It is important to note that the relevance of a prior record dissipates 
over time, such that if an offender remains crime-free for approximately
seven years, his or her likelihood of reoffending is approximately the same 
as for a person without a criminal history.471  Thus, prior convictions should
cease to be taken into account after this period. 
IV. INCIDENTAL ADVANTAGE OF LESS WEIGHT BEING ACCORDED TO 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The above discussion recommends less weight being accorded to prior 
convictions in sentencing determinations.  This will have the incidental 
benefit of diminishing the discriminatory impact of the criminal justice 
system against offenders from deprived social backgrounds.472 
The problem of disadvantaged offenders is one of the most perplexing
sentencing issues. It is a worldwide phenomenon that people from poor 
and disadvantaged backgrounds commit far more crime than other 
citizens.473  Compliance with legal standards that preserve and entrench 
existing social institutions and practices is much more difficult for those 
who are not flourishing under the status quo.474  Social disadvantage not 
470. As shown by the Dutch previous conviction enhancement law, to be effective, 
the premium does not need to be oppressive. See Vollaard, supra note 442, at 282. 
471. See Ezell, supra note 375, at 43; Megan C. Kurlycheck et al., Scarlet Letters 
and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 483, 490 (2006).
472. See supra note 466 and accompanying text. 
473. See BOX, supra note 412, at 96–97; Carlen, supra note 412, at 309. 





   






















        
    
    
   
   
only prompts rebellion, but people from such groups have less to lose 
from being sentenced to custody, hence the fear of imprisonment is not
as great.475  By punishing people from deprived backgrounds more severely
on their next—inevitable—conviction, despite the fact that the reasons 
for their predicament are largely not of their doing, sentencing law and
practice perpetuates the social injustices that such people endure.
The unfair manner in which the criminal justice system works against
offenders from deprived backgrounds has led to some of the most 
eminent commentators on punishment to retract or rethink their theories 
of punishment.476  For example, it led both Jeffrie Murphy and von Hirsch
to abandon the unfair advantage theory of punishment. Von Hirsch
accepted that the theory requires “a heroic belief in the justice of the
underlying social arrangements.  Unless it is in fact true that our social
and political systems have succeeded in providing for mutual benefits for
all members including any criminal offender, then the offender has not
necessarily gained from others’ law-abiding behavior.”477  Murphy stated 
that punishment on this model was not justified until “we have restructured
society in such a way that criminals genuinely do correspond to the only 
model that will render punishment permissible—make sure that they are 
autonomous and that they do benefit in the requisite sense.”478 
H.L.A. Hart suggests that, although there should not be a general
defense of economic temptation, “[for] those who are below a minimum 
level of economic prosperity . . . [perhaps] we should incorporate as a 
further excusing condition the pressure of gross forms of economic 
necessity.”479 Antony Duff also accepts that his theory of punishment is
not suitable in our present inequitable world: “[P]unishment is not
justifiable within our present legal system; it will not be justifiable 
unless and until we have brought about deep and far-reaching social,
political, legal and moral changes in ourselves and our society.”480  Duff 
believes that society’s failure to accord all citizens the concern and respect 
that they deserve provides disadvantaged offenders with the strongest 
moral basis for resisting punishment not because their actions are justifiable 
or excusable but because society cannot morally condemn them.481  And,
475.  See id. at 310, 312. 
476.  The same observation is made by TONRY, supra note 50, at 17–18. 
477. VON HIRSCH, supra note 175, at 58. 
478. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 243
(1973).
479. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 51 (1968). 
480. DUFF, supra note 168, at 294. 
481. Anthony Duff, Punishment, Citizenship & Responsibility, in  PUNISHMENT, 
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more recently, Richard Frase stated “it may be both unfair (to vulnerable 
minorities) and unwise (more costly for society) to impose prior-conviction
enhancements which have a strongly disparate impact on racial-minority 
offenders.”482 
There is no ready solution to what ought to be done to remedy the
problem of offenders from deprived backgrounds.  Given that the
underprivileged do not choose poverty or social deprivation, and the efforts 
that are required to rise out of their predicament are enormous, there are
extremely powerful arguments for treating disadvantaged offenders more 
leniently.483  This could be done by making social deprivation a defense or
perhaps a concrete mitigating factor at sentencing. Legislators and
courts traditionally balk at such solutions,484 either for fear that they would 
result in an escalation in the crime rate or because of the difficulty in 
determining the level of deprivation that would be sufficient to warrant a
sentencing discount.485  Von Hirsch also suggests that socially disadvantaged
offenders may be better off not getting a discount due to some notion of 
diminished responsibility because “[p]ersons deemed incapable of
responsibility for their actions tend to be seen as less than fully adult, and 
can become the target of proactive forms of state intervention that may
be still more intrusive than the criminal law.”486  Thus, there may be some
pragmatic considerations that militate against positively implementing 
482. Frase, supra note 5, at 132. 
483. The argument that social deprivation should not be a defense because there are 
many people from such backgrounds who lead law-abiding lives—and hence, there is
supposedly no necessary link between poverty and crime—is as barren as the argument 
that smoking does not cause bad health because there are many people who do not 
experience health problems from smoking.
484. For example, in Australia, coming from a disadvantaged background is not in
itself a mitigating factor.  See In re Daniel (1997) 94 A Crim R 96, 125–26 (Austl.); In
re E (A Child) (1993) 66 A Crim R 14, 31–32 (Austl.); Neal v The Queen (1982) 149
CLR 305, 326 (Austl.). 
485. See In re Daniel, (1997) 94 A Crim R at 126. For an argument in favor of the 
defense of economic duress, see Barbara A. Hudson, Mitigation for Socially Deprived
Offenders, in  PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY, supra note 
179, at 205, 207–08. 
486. Andrew von Hirsch, The Politics of “Just Deserts,” 32 CANADIAN J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 397, 409 (1990).  Von Hirsch accepts that the extent to which social
deprivation diminishes criminal responsibility is a difficult matter, but ultimately finds it 
difficult to believe that social deprivation renders all law-breakers beyond fault. See id.
He suggests a penalty discount may be appropriate where an offender from a deprived 
background can establish particular reasons why the deprivation made it more difficult 
for compliance with the law. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 207, at 107–08. 
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measures in the criminal justice system to claw back some of the
disadvantages experienced by such offenders.487 
Irrespective of the merits of the arguments that have been made 
against treating offenders from deprived social backgrounds more lightly, it
has never been persuasively argued that a rotten social background 
should serve as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  Yet, this is precisely
the perverse outcome that follows as a result of giving weight to prior 
convictions in the sentencing calculus.  Socially disadvantaged offenders 
are far more likely to have prior convictions, and it is they who
overwhelmingly bear the brunt of the extra punishment that is meted out 
for previous misdeeds.488  For example, an analysis of California
correctional statistics found that although African Americans comprise 
only seven percent of California’s population, they represent almost
half—forty-three percent—of third-strike inmates.489  Similar figures
come from Washington,490 where African Americans account for about
thirteen percent of the state’s population yet represent about forty percent of
three-strikes casualties.491  More widely, the rate of imprisonment of
Black non-Hispanic males in the United States is more than six times 
higher than the general population and three times higher than the male
Hispanic population.492  In Australia, the overrepresentation of indigenous 
prisoners is even greater, currently reaching a disturbing ratio of fifteen
to one when compared to the rest of the community.493 
487. See von Hirsch, supra note 486, at 398. 
488. See Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 
37 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 97, 100, 102 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008); 
Frase, supra note 5, at 132; Brett E. Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality in the 
American Prison Population: Using the Blumstein Method To Address the Critical Race 
And Justice Issue of the 21st Century, JUST. POL’Y J. 4–5 (Dec. 18 2008), http://www.
cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/racial_disproportionality.pdf. 
489. McMurry, supra note 72, at 12–13.  More recent data reveal similar trends. 
See Chen, supra note 421, at 364–65. 
490. However, the number of people sentenced under three-strikes laws is
significantly less in Washington—281 offenders under three-strikes laws compared to
California’s almost 100,000 offenders. See Chen, supra note 421, at 350–51. 
491. See McMurry, supra note 72, at 13. 
492. HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 9 (2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf; 
see also CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, CREATED EQUAL: RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2009), available at http://www.
nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/created-equal.pdf (noting that nationally,
African Americans are six times more likely to be incarcerated than whites). The over-
representation of racial minorities in the United Kingdom is similar.  See PRISON REFORM
TRUST, BROMLEY BRIEFINGS PRISON FACTFILE 37 (2013), available at http://www.prison 
reformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Factfile%20autumn%202013.pdf. 
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Thus, the way that previous convictions are now treated causes the 
sentencing system to operate in a discriminatory fashion against
disadvantaged offenders.  Such offenders are more likely to have prior 
convictions, and on the basis of this irrelevant consideration, to be sentenced
more severely.494  Attaching less weight to prior convictions will not cure
the ills that make it more likely that offenders from deprived social
backgrounds will commit crime, but the advantage of ignoring prior
convictions is that it will ensure that every time such offenders are
sentenced, their punishment will be no more than that imposed on the 
affluent offender who has committed the same crime. Disadvantaged
offenders will still appear in court more frequently than other offenders,
but unless they have committed a serious sexual or violent offense, their
sentence would be determined on the basis of the instant offense, not 
according to other factors.  In some jurisdictions, this could mean the 
difference between life imprisonment or a small fine.495 
V. CONCLUSION AND REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS
Criminal law and sentencing are mainly concerned with punishing and 
preventing harmful acts.  The severity of punishment should principally 
be contingent upon the harm caused by the crime.496  However, in some
jurisdictions over the past few decades, the seemingly instinctive 
exasperation and intolerance towards those who repeatedly break the law 
has been fermented in an unbridled and nonreflective manner, resulting 
in prior criminality assuming a grossly disproportionate weight in sentencing 
determinations. 
It emerges that there is no retributive theory that justifies a recidivist 
premium. However, on the basis of the current empirical evidence and
utilitarian account of punishment, a recidivist premium is justified in 
limited circumstances and in limited doses.  Two of the key utilitarian 
rationales in support of a recidivist premium are misguided.  Harsher 
penalties do not discourage individual offenders or potential offenders 
494. See Elaine R. Jones, The Failure of the “Get Tough” Crime Policy, 20 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 803, 803–05 (1995); Nkechi Taifa, “Three-Strikes-and-You’re-Out”—Mandatory 
Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 719 (1995). 
495. See supra Part II (discussing that the United States punishes recidivists more 
harshly than Sweden).

















   
  
from committing crime.  Specific deterrence and general deterrence,
accordingly, cannot support enhanced sentences for recidivists. 
However, the evidence regarding the efficacy of punishment to achieve
the goal of incapacitation is more positive.  The key findings are as 
follows:497 
 Prior offending is a good indicator of future offending where 
there is a large number of prior convictions and the offending 
relates to nonserious offenses.  However, this does not justify 
a considerable recidivist premium because the cost of 
imprisonment outweighs the impact of the crime. 
 Most people who commit serious sexual and violent offenses 
do not reoffend. 
 Yet, most people who commit serious offenses have a prior 
conviction for an offense of this nature. 
 Serious offenders who have been in jail more than once 
reoffend at a higher rate than first-time prisoners. 
 In order for increased prison terms to reduce crime, there is no 
need for the enhancements to be oppressive. 
 Prior convictions more than seven years old are less relevant. 
Thus, although the prior commission of sexual and violent crimes is not 
a good predictor of future crimes of this nature, there is a link between
past and future offending, and this link is stronger in relation to offenders
who have been in prison more than once.  Even though it is not possible 
to determine whether an offender who has committed a serious offense 
in the past will similarly reoffend in the future, we know that a significant 
portion of any group of such offenders will reoffend.  Taking the entire 
group out of circulation by imprisoning them will reduce the incidence 
of serious crimes.  Hence, the goal of general incapacitation for serious 
offenders is effective and justifies a recidivist premium.
However, the length of the premium needs to factor in the crudeness 
of the process and the fact that depriving offenders of their liberty is a 
considerable impost.  Hence, the recidivist premium in such cases should 
not be excessive—no more than, say, twenty to fifty percent.
Any premium that is accorded to recidivists beyond this is a concession 
to group instinct in the form of intolerance towards those who transgress
the criminal law. However, when it comes to inflicting penalties that
fundamentally set back the interests of individuals, in a just society,
feelings should not trump moral and doctrinal norms. The current
subservience to prior criminality in sentencing determinations subjects 
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most recidivist offenders to imprisonment without justification and harms
society by diverting large amounts of public revenue needlessly into
prisons.  The unfairness and discriminatory impact of such a practice is a
stain on the current system of criminal justice. 
417
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